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Abstract
Telecommunications privatization, competition, liberalization, and regulatory independence
in several countries have been embarked with the goals of maximizing universal access to
telecommunications services as a developmental goal, promoting efficiency through
competition and establishment of world class telecommunications networks. Using interview
data from India and China âthe two countries that have very different governments and
policies, leading to differing approaches to the introduction of telecommunication
competition and infrastructure development -- this paper provides analyses of privatization,
competition, liberalization processes and legal frameworks governing telecommunications.
India has set policy via recommendations of publicly visible independent regulatory authority
while China has pursued a strategy of competition among government-owned organizations.
The Indian case study shows evidence of complimentarity between privatization and
competition in deepening network penetration and in dramatically restraining the rise of
service pricing among privatized operators. Chinaâs case study reveals that the state
retained all the control rights, planned the countryâs infrastructure development and made
very little progress in regulatory reform including the enactment of telecoms laws, yet made
substantial progress in infrastructure development. It remains to be seen whether India's
relatively transparent and market driven approach to telecommunications policy (and access)
will prove effective in the long run.
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Introduction 
 
The purpose of this research has been to study privatization, liberalization1, competition, 
and the establishment of independent regulatory regimes in the telecommunications sector in 
several centrally planned economies. The liberalization of telecommunication markets through 
the introduction of regulatory reforms is changing the way countries approach universal access 
and service policies. This is due, in part, to the fact that services are being provisioned more 
rapidly, prices are falling, and new and innovative services are being introduced—all to the 
benefit of economic development.  Notwithstanding these benefits, the public-private equity 
sharing balance still remains unresolved in regulatory reform. Given the author’s commitment to 
practitioner-scholarship, this research project aimed toward contributing to the understanding 
and potential development of regulatory policy choices concerning a flexible and open regulatory 
environment conducive to sustaining advancement of telecommunications technology and 
services and through that, economic development, which are practical concerns of national 
administrations involved in regulatory reform. 
 
Motivation 
Telecommunications markets in developing countries have been undergoing dramatic 
reforms since the 1990s. Changes in technology, the abysmal performance of incumbent service 
providers, notably the state controlled monopolies, and urgings by The World Bank and other 
international lending institutions have forced the developing countries to privatize state-owned 
telecom providers, thereby opening portions of their telecom markets to competition, and 
building regulatory institutions. Policy analysts and experts possess good theoretical 
understanding of the likely effects of privatization and competition and of the importance of 
regulation, as the monopoly provider is privatized. However, comprehensive empirical 
knowledge of their effects in developing countries is lacking.  What we have available today are 
case studies and non-quantitative comparisons of telecom performance before and after 
privatization (Ure, 1997).  These studies are important in that they provide good theoretical 
understanding of the likely effects of privatization and competition and of the importance of 
regulation, as a monopoly service provider such as a state controlled telecommunications entity 
is privatized; also needed is a more practical understanding of the interplay of three broad sets of 
variables that this paper discusses: 
 
• Motivation for privatization 
• Interests and values of interest groups, and  
• Their impact on policy makers that determine the nature of privatization. 
 
This practical understanding is the gap that exists because reforms in developing countries are a 
relatively recent occurrence.  
 
                                                          
1 Liberalization is a process of changing state, social and economic institutions to allow and promote increased use of 
market mechanisms to guide social, economic, and political life. 
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Approach 
Government motivations (as expressed by the types and values regularly considered in 
shaping privatization decisions, whether they are related to various development goals, social 
goals, external considerations, or intangible factors) and industry structures either clash or the 
governments make some decision(s) that influences the Information and Communications 
Technologies growth and expansion. For instance, one of the privatization options is to allow for 
private ownership, while regulating the owners to achieve certain goals. This option has been 
exercised in several Asia Pacific countries where the government privatized the telecoms entities 
but then asked the private owners to achieve certain goals, which influenced the attainment of 
those goals.  To explore the structure of privatization, it is therefore pertinent to take a close look 
at the behavioral expectations or the requirements that the government may have.  That is partly 
an empirical question, or the discovery that this research undertook, while conducting the full 
qualitative research and analysis.  
The research was conducted to review India and China in terms of each country’s 
historical and economic circumstances, as well as its need for internal political accommodation 
that determined its pace toward telecommunications restructuring.  Looking at the outcome of 
telecoms restructuring in these countries, at the conclusion of the qualitative phase, the author 
was able to address a series of questions: 
 
• How are any of these privatization and liberalization outcomes similar? 
• How are they different? 
• If they have some things in common, what is the general category to which they 
belong? 
• If they are different, do they indicate that telecoms restructuring efforts are only as 
effective as a particular country’s socio-political-economic environment allow them 
to be? 2 
 
In the qualitative phase, question 4 has been particularly important. There are three broad set of 
variables: 
 
• Motivation for privatization; 
• Interests and values of interest groups; and 
• Their impact on policy makers that determine the nature of privatization. 
 
Between the motivation for privatization and the interests and values of interest groups, there is 
the phenomenon of complexity to study (see Figure 1), for in the final analysis, the practice 
question has to be addressed: What is it that we want to affect?  
                                                          
2 In other words, who are the main agents of change in an emergent situation? Are these the organized interest groups. 
(Becker 1983; Olson 1965; Peltzman 1976; Stigler 1975) originating from the country’s socio-political-economic 
environment that are most dissatisfied with how the Telecoms Regulatory Authority accommodates their interests 
(Greenwood & Hinings 1996; Holm 1995; Seo & Creed 2002;  Sjöstrand 1995)? There are multiple potential sources 
of misalignment between “an institutional arrangement … [and] the interests and needs of its participants” (Seo 
&Creed 2002, p. 232), the focus of this paper is on the common case of organized interest groups that perceive 
themselves to be disadvantaged by the distributional consequences of an emergent telecoms regulatory institution. 
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It is not enough to say that we want to affect the structure of privatization process. 
However, by looking at the interplay among the three broad set of variables, we might get a 
practical understanding of: 
 
• How the interests and values of private actors create institutional pressures that affect 
the nature of privatization decisions;  
• How those interests and values get processed; and  
• The extent to which decisions affect the behavior of interest groups in ways that are 
consistent with regulatory policy choices for a flexible and open regulatory 
environment conducive to sustaining advancement of telecommunications technology 
and services and through that, economic development.   
 
Research Question 
The practical understanding is crucial in obtaining a clear, strategic, and wise answer to 
the research question: under what circumstances is clash between institutions making regulatory 
policy decisions and interests and values of interest groups the likely result and under what 
circumstances is the privatization decision likely to translate into behavior that is consistent with 
development goals (as manifested in the motivation for privatization).  
 
Data Source 
This research deals with many decisions that policy makers make that influence the 
nature and extent of privatization. The decision making about privatization has two aspects: 
First, the interests that are relevant to various parameters of the privatization decision, namely, 
interests in: 
 
• Development 
• Employment 
• National pride 
• Gaining favor with the IMF, World Bank, etc. 
 
Secondly, the political-economic aspect: 
 
• The institutional features of any system that give preference, weight, or force to any 
particular argument, recommendation, or claim. 
 
The author argues that item 2a has been particularly under-attended in prior telecommunications 
research.  
As part of the standard procedures of essential analytic processes, the author obtained 
interview data to uncover privatization decision action, including the preceding interaction with 
many political constituencies expressing many different types of interests, and the aggregation 
and balancing of those interests. Such decision action/interaction was traced over time to note 
how and if the privatization decision changed or what enabled it to remain the same with changes 
in structural conditions.  The author interviewed former privatization minister, other senior 
regulatory officers who may not be holding offices any more, as well as journalists, trade 
association and corporate executives. These scholars, industry experts, and previous Cabinet 
ministers were interested in recounting and describing their experiences in particular country 
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decision making situations. These descriptions provided the author with a series of evolving 
sequences of privatization action/interaction that occurred over time and space. The decision 
action/interaction was orderly, interrupted, sequential, and coordinated—or, in some cases, a 
complete mess.  Those were the kinds of stuff that this research planned to uncover: How the 
interests that get expressed and are relevant to the privatization decision got processed and how 
we understand what WEIGHT they were given. Only the people who were once the main actors 
and players could answer these questions.  That then was the purpose of recruiting and 
interviewing the past/present privatization experts and scholars. 
The author’s early contacts with them indicated that they were often distrustful of 
traditional research. Instead, these people favored mechanisms that assured them anonymity.  
Accordingly, the author does not include any information in this paper that will make it possible 
to identify a participant, when this paper is published.   
Findings 
The qualitative research to-date indicates that reforms have dramatically transformed the 
telecommunications sector in several countries. For example, roughly two percent of 
telecommunications firms in 167 countries were privatized in 1980; by 1998, the number 
increased to forty-two percent. In many developing countries, competition, especially in mobile 
phone, has increased rapidly since 2003. 
The worldwide movement toward privatization and competition in the telecoms sector in 
the 1990s provides an industry context for studying the effects of privatization and competition 
in general. Countries often use privatization and liberalization in this sector to signal their 
seriousness about instituting pro-market reforms. 
 
Overall Conclusions/Theoretical Findings 
The dynamics of international relations, mainly in financial flows, coupled with the 
changing technology have created a new landscape whereby employers, employees and 
government officials are witnessing a new pattern of relations. The concept of progress is 
undergoing changes. 
The new demand is for economic democracy. Restructuring now means the prevalence of 
economic rationality through market orientation with social concerns to avoid exclusion and 
misery. Professor Marcovitch observes that privatization has been one way of avoiding 
inefficiency when supplying services that are of general interest (Marcovitch, 2005). He argues 
that in spite of the benefits and apparent relationship between privatization, restructuring and 
economic democracy, further research is needed. 
It is clear from this qualitative research that there is an objective relationship between the 
above dimensions but a direct link between cause and effect can only be determined through 
further studies. Further to Marcovitch’s observations, countries such as India and sectors such as 
the telecommunications industry provide examples of the virtuous circle between privatization, 
restructuring and economic democracy.  
In 1998, India entered the second phase of the revolution brought about by telecoms 
privatization. Having sold government assets in the mobile telecoms sector, there was nothing 
left to sell. There was, however, plenty of scope for the competition and price cutting that then 
followed. Other countries that have been slower off the mark in the privatization race must take 
note: this second stage was more painful, more controversial and more beneficial than the first. 
The Indian consumer at last became the chief beneficiary of telecoms competition. Since then the  
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Figure 1. Study of the phenomenon of complexity 
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new Government has been increasing competition to benefit those who put them in power: the 
general mass. 
The independent regulator in telecoms industry in India, Telecoms Regulatory Authority 
of India (TRAI), is encouraged by their new political masters. TRAI is reviewing licenses and 
exercising its authority. A new competition bill, which came into effect in 1998, increased the 
power of the watchdog to tackle anti-competitive practices in the mobile sector.   
In this context, the positive attitude of all the social players are crucial in order to 
reinforce the conviction that privatization and restructuring can be conducted in the interests of 
the people.  
The privatization of the telecommunications industry in India has also demonstrated that 
it is possible to privatize companies and enhance benefits for the individual. To succeed in this 
task, it has been necessary to promote a change in regulatory policy in a way that spurs 
technological innovation and provides incentives for companies to create markets for new 
services as well as expand their current service markets, allowing them to create several new job 
training and retraining schemes that have played an important role in maintaining employment 
security in both existing and newly formed companies, by disclosing information and strategy 
which allowed a genuine participatory approach. Integrating all the social players has given 
transparency to the privatization process and provided economic democracy.  
 
Implications for Practice 
As discussed under “Approach,” between the motivation for privatization and the interests and 
values of interest groups, there is the phenomenon of complexity to study (see Figure 1 below), 
for in the final analysis, the practice question has to be addressed: What is it that we want to 
affect? 
The author argues that by looking at the interplay among the three broad set of variables, we 
might get a practical understanding of: 
 
• How the interests and values of private actors create institutional pressures that affect 
the nature of privatization decisions;  
• How those interests and values get processed; and  
• The extent to which decisions affect the behavior of interest groups in ways that are 
consistent with regulatory policy choices for a flexible and open regulatory 
environment conducive to sustaining advancement of telecommunications technology 
and services and through that, economic development3.   
 
This practical understanding benefits us in more than one way. First, it provides a clear, strategic, 
and wise answer to the research question: under what circumstances is clash between institutions 
making regulatory policy decisions and interests and values of interest groups the likely result 
                                                          
3  Improving the teledensity of a nation is an important policy objective, both for providing better connectivity among 
the country’s population and the several beneficial spillover effects. One such effect is the positive boost to a country’s 
economic growth associated with higher teledensity. Empirical evidence in both developed and developing countries 
shows that an increase in teledensity contributes substantially to an improvement in real income and job creation 
through encouragement of viable small entrepreneurial business enterprises at the grassroots level. These enterprises 
principally operate in the service sector, expanding it to the most consequential level vis-à-vis manufacturing and 
agriculture. From the government point of view, this will result in a rapid widening of the economic base without 
necessitating a corresponding rise in government staffing. 
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and under what circumstances is the privatization decision likely to translate into behavior that 
is consistent with development goals (as manifested in the motivation for privatization).  
Secondly, our practical understanding forms the basis for affecting the structure of privatization 
process in future.  
Third, there has been much theoretical and empirical research on the effects of privatization and 
competition in infrastructure in general. However, relatively little work has been done on:  
 
• Why is the reform process at different stage in different countries?  
• Why is the extent of the reforms larger in some countries than in others?  
• How the degree of privatization and competition affects performance? 
• How components of the policies interact in shaping the reform outcomes? 
• Is privatization (or competition) alone sufficient in improving economic 
development4? 
• Or, are privatization and competition complementary policies? 
 
The practical understanding should lead one to appreciate the dynamics of change and 
transformation in clear, strategic, and operational terms. 
 
 
Relevance of Grounded Theory to Privatization and Restructuring Research 
 
This paper articulates the use of grounded theory, originated and most fully articulated by 
Glaser & Strauss (1967) in their seminal work The Discovery of Grounded Theory: strategies for 
qualitative research, in this research. The objective of the grounded theoretical approach, as 
interpreted5 by Wells (1995), is an explanation of the variability in social interactions, the social 
structural conditions that support the interactions, the consequences of the interactions and the 
conditions that support changes in interactions over time.  Wells’ interpretation is noteworthy in 
that this research is about the explanation of the variability of social and political interaction as 
well as the consequences of the interaction in the realm of telecoms restructuring.  
                                                          
4   Economic development: Breaking down of traditional barriers to distribution and sales of rural produce in urban 
markets and vice versa, acceleration of literacy and education rates in the general public and consequent 
improvement in real income, and job creation through encouragement of viable small entrepreneurial business 
enterprises at the grassroots level. These enterprises principally operate in the services sector, expanding it to the 
most consequential level vis-a-vis manufacturing and agriculture, which presently dominates. From the government 
point of view, this results in a rapid widening of the direct tax base without necessitating a corresponding rise in 
government staffing. However, income from direct telecom revenues will be much slower, thus reinforcing the 
government policy of expanding capacity through the private sector 
 
5 There are a variety of applied interpretive assessments of what constitutes grounded theory, however, the one 
developed by Strauss and Corbin (1990) is referenced most commonly by researchers. This work is considered to be 
"the clearest theoretical exposition of this important research tradition" (Miller & Fredericks, 1999). Strauss and 
Corbin define a grounded theory as one that is: ".......inductively derived from the study of the phenomenon it 
represents. That is, it is discovered, developed and provisionally verified through systematic data collection and 
analysis of data pertaining to that phenomenon. Therefore, data collection, analysis and theory stand in reciprocal 
relationship with each other." (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).  
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In an historical context, grounded theory may be considered to have evolved from and 
continues to be compatible with the symbolic interactionist approach6 to the study of human 
behavior (Robrecht 1995, Wells 1995). Sociologist George Herbert Mead and later Blumer 
(1986) employed the symbolic interactionism approach, with the articulation of three key 
principles7:  
Symbolic Interactionism holds the principal of meaning as central in human behavior. 
Meaning states that humans act toward people and things based upon the meanings that they 
have given to those people or things.  
The second core principle is language. Language gives humans a means by which to 
negotiate meaning through symbols. Mead's influence on Blumer becomes apparent here because 
Mead believed that naming assigned meaning, thus naming was the basis for human society and 
the extent of knowledge.  
The third core principle is that of thought. Thought modifies each individual's 
interpretation of symbols. Thought, based-on language, is a mental conversation or dialogue that 
requires role taking, or imagining different points of view. 
While conducting interviews, the author found symbolic interactionism approach with its 
key premises to hold the promise of uncovering privatization decision actions, including any 
preceding interaction with many political constituencies expressing many different types of 
interests, and the aggregation and balancing of those interests.  This and the notion that the fields 
of medicine, nursing, social work, and education8 share the common socio-behavioral foundation 
with the study of human interaction within an organization suggests that grounded theory may be 
a useful methodology for application in the investigation of phenomena in this later domain. This 
research paper therefore uses grounded theory’s practical and theoretical suitability, to the 
maximum extent possible, as a form of qualitative inquiry into complex, multi-dimensional 
phenomena observed in an organizational /institutional context that this research sought to 
evaluate to further the process of formulating creative, workable, effective interventions through 
the use of policy/grounded action.  
Using 1990 through 2003 data of key centrally planned countries9, the research has 
focused on an initial analysis of the effects of telecommunications performance of privatization, 
competition (as measured by the number of mobile operators in the country not owned by the 
incumbent), and regulation.10  Subsequently with additional interview data, the research work 
                                                          
6 Symbolic Interactionism is the process of interaction in the formation of meanings for individuals. John Dewey 
insisted that human beings are best understood in relation to their environment (Society for More Creative Speech, 
1996). With this as his inspiration, Herbert Blumer outlined Symbolic Interactionism, a study of human group life 
and conduct. 
 
7 Blumer came up with three core principles to his theory. They are meaning, language, and thought. These core 
principles lead to conclusions about the creation of a person's self and socialization into a larger community (Griffin, 
1997).  
 
8  Many contemporary authors have argued that grounded theory is the research methodology of choice in the 
qualitatively oriented research fields of medicine, nursing, social work and education (Wells 1995, Miller & 
Fredericks 1999). 
 
9 This dataset was originally collected by the author of this paper as part of a study commissioned by the Financial 
Times of London in 1998-1999 timeframe. 
 
10 The privatization, competition, and regulatory variables are to be obtained from International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU) publications, Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) publications, and from the US Department of 
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has been supplemented to identify and define some key factors or associations that policy makers 
evaluate to determine the nature and extent of privatization. There are two aspects of decision 
making that this research addresses: 
The interests that are relevant to various parameters of the privatization decision, namely, 
interests in: 
 
• Development 
• Employment 
• National pride 
• Gaining favor with the IMF, World Bank, etc. 
 
The political-economic aspect: 
 
• The institutional features of any system that give preference, weight, or force to any 
particular argument, recommendation, or claim. 
 
The author contends that item 2a has been particularly under-attended in prior 
telecommunications research.  
As part of the standard methods and procedures of essential analytic processes, the author 
has conducted interviews to uncover privatization decision actions, including any preceding 
interaction with many political constituencies expressing many different types of interests, and 
the aggregation and balancing of those interests. The interest groups include: 
A powerful liberalization coalition comprising:  
 
• International and domestic businesses supported by foreign governments and 
international organizations;  
• Urban users who are exerting pressures through the media and other agencies; 
• An opposing coalition consisting of the trade unions and politicians supported by 
domestic businesses that benefit from the past or extant inward-oriented policies and 
have a stake in keeping multi-national corporations out of the market.  
 
The author has been particularly interested in investigating how the interests that get 
expressed and are relevant to the privatization decisions get processed and if a certain structure 
results in a certain outcome or if under some circumstances the structure is likely to translate into 
behavior of the interest groups that is consistent or inconsistent with regulatory policy choices 
concerning a flexible and open regulatory environment conducive to sustaining advancement of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Commerce.  Privatization is a dummy variable in that it does not capture the extent of privatization. Rather it simply 
indicates whether a government sold part of the firm. Competition is measured by the number of wireless operators 
in a country not owned by the incumbent.  This may not be a perfect measure of competition for cellular service is 
effectively available only to the wealthy in very poor countries. However, mobile operators offer benchmark 
comparisons of the incumbent and are potential threats to the incumbent.  Mobile operators can increase penetration 
rapidly at relatively low cost per additional subscriber, thereby forcing the incumbent to improve its services. 
 
The information concerning regulatory measure will be collected from ITU publications.  It is also a dummy 
variable indicating whether a country maintains a separate telecommunications regulatory agency not directly under 
the control of a ministry. A separate regulator is typically indicative of attempts at regulatory reform. 
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telecommunications technology and services and through that of economic development, which 
are the practical concerns of national administrations involved in the regulatory reform problem.   
Through several semi-structured interviews with key representatives11 of the various 
coalitions identified above, the author has collected data on liberalization, competition, the 
establishment of independent authority, and privatization for satisfactorily completing the 
telecoms reforms in India and China. In these interview studies grounded theory is used to 
capture information needed to explicate the interactions between groups and organizations. 
According to Glaser and Strauss (1967) theories are either deducted from logical assumptions or 
generated from observation. The resulting theory is an explanation of categories, their properties, 
and the relationships among them. The results lead to an evolutionary body of knowledge that is 
grounded in data.  That, then, is the primary reason for using grounded theory to interpret 
interviews. 
 
The Elements of Grounded Theory 
Grounded theory has three basic elements: concepts, categories and propositions. These 
are discussed in great detail in Appendix C.  However, it is important to mention here that the 
basic units of analysis are concepts, for it is through conceptualization of data, not the actual data 
per se, that theory will emerge. According to Corbin and Strauss (1990, p. 7): 
“Theories can't be built with actual incidents or activities as observed or reported; that is, 
from "raw data." The incidents, events, happenings are taken as, or analyzed as, potential 
indicators of phenomena, which are thereby given conceptual labels. … Only by comparing 
incidents and naming like phenomena with the same term can the theorist accumulate the basic 
units for theory.” 
The unit of data (see Appendix C) in this study is the literature on the subject of telecoms 
restructuring. According to Strauss and Corbin (1990), 
 
The literature can be used as secondary sources of data. Research publications often include 
quoted materials from interviews and field notes and these quotations can be used as secondary 
sources of data for your own purposes. The publications may also include descriptive materials 
concerning events, actions, settings, and actors' perspectives, that can be used as data using the 
methods described.  (p. 52) 
 
The grounded analysis of the first 'literature' case from India led to the generation of the 
initial theoretical framework of complexity analysis. Additional 'empirical' cases from China 
have been used to test and extend this framework.12
After the analysis of the two/three case memos, there was hardly any improvement 
needed to the theoretical framework and the decision to conclude the research, which began with 
                                                          
11 Samples include people who are experiencing the social-economic-political process being investigated. 
 
12 The principle of theoretical sampling points out that each additional case serves specific purposes within the overall 
scope of enquiry. Yin identified three options (1989):  (a) Choose a case to fill theoretical categories, to extend the 
emerging theory; and/or, (b) Choose a case to replicate previous case(s) to test the emerging theory; or, (c) Choose a 
case that is a polar opposite to extend the emerging theory.  Each additional case must, therefore, be carefully selected 
to produce similar results (a literal replication - options (a) and (b) above); or, contrary results but for predictable 
reasons (a theoretical replication - option (c) above). The second case or unit of data, China which experienced a 
telecoms restructuring during the period 1990-99, was selected for the purpose of literal replication, that is, to fill 
theoretical categories and to test the emerging theory. The third case, Russia which experienced contrary results during 
the period 1975-89 was again chosen for the purposes of theoretical replication. 
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an investigation of the three questions identified in page 3, was taken. This experience is line 
with Martin and Turner (1986), who affirm: 
 
By the time three or four sets of data have been analyzed, the majority of useful concepts will have 
been discovered (refer to Appendix C). (p. 149) 
 
The emergent theory of telecoms restructuring has been compared with the extant 
theories in the broader field of crisis hypothesis, special interest groups, learning, foreign aid, 
and political institutions. This revealed the discovered theory to resemble in many ways Li et al. 
(2004) "constituents demand hypothesis, private-interest hypothesis, the ideology hypothesis, 
and some hypothesis emerging from the new institutional economics."  
 
 
Building Individual Cases: India & China 
 
First Memo: India, View of Epistemology 
The author interviewed one of the highest ranking policy advisors in India. He had the 
unenviable task of getting the country’s top public sector undertakings out of the mess through 
privatization.13 That meant convincing a whole lot of politicians, trade unions, and cajoling 
‘unionized’ employees of these loss making inefficient units. To protect his identity, this 
regulator would remain anonymous and for identifying him in this paper, we would refer to him 
as Regulator 1 (Reg_1).    
 
Epistemology.  Reg_1 clearly has an objective view of knowing, particularly in the 
context of the limits or validity of the various ways of knowing and learning. He traces the recent 
telecoms market and regulatory developments in India, which have dramatically altered a 
difficult telecoms market environment into a positive one with immense possibilities.14   
One of the major factors contributing to unprecedented growth is the low price level; 
Reg_1 explains that it is important that efforts be made to seek ways to enable further price 
declines, even if such policies adversely affect the Government’s revenue objectives in the near-
term, for the long-term effect would lead to higher revenues.   
He recalled that in 2003, mobile telephony sector was reporting huge losses, resulting in 
complete stoppage of all on-going investments. The entire sector was up in arms against each 
                                                          
13 As to why privatization did not occur until late 1990s, one can point to the reluctance of the Indian state to pursue 
these changes because of resistance from entrenched and powerful interest groups tied to the state that benefited 
from a closed economy and from planned development. 
 
Initially telecommunications was a very low priority for government. When it did become a high priority, 
investment was slowed by the efforts to develop an indigenous switch. Moreover, the stronger public sector 
institutions of equipment makers and service providers also slowed privatization and other policy liberalization as 
bureaucrats and labor unions and other beneficiaries of subsidies resisted reform. 
 
14 Mobile telephone started in 1995-96 and 2002-03, reached a figure of 13 million, after 8 years of mobile 
telephony. TRAI took certain steps in 2003-04 and this number increased to 33.6 million during the year, a growth 
of 12.7 times the average growth in earlier years. India today envisions being able to reach 100 million mobiles by 
2006, thereby achieving the 2010 target four years ahead of schedule. 
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other, with the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI)15 and the Government of India in 
different courts. 
TRAI took a number of steps that included, inter alia, the introduction of a revised 
Interconnect Usage Charge (IUC) Regime, taking account of various comments about 
sustainable competition in an increasingly converging environment; a pro-competition policy 
with termination charges at low rates; the introduction of a reduced Access Deficit Charge 
(ADC), bringing downward pressure on tariff; the introduction of a Calling Party Pays Regime, 
again, making mobile service cheaper; the introduction of a Unified Licensing Regime, with 
Unified Access Service License as a first step, providing flexibility to the operators to decide 
and implement tariffs; a decision not to intervene in handset pricing while specifying that any 
tariff schema must be available to subscribers irrespective of where they procure the handset; and 
a planned transition to the new License regime for the operators.  
Reg_1 explained that the TRAI focused on facilitating growth by enhancing competition 
among operators, thereby enabling more affordable services to the consumers. He observed that 
this regulatory environment, coupled with intense competition that ensued, had a major effect on 
tariffs for mobile and national and international long distance calls,16 and on innovative schemes 
to offer mobile handsets.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Growth in cellular subscriber base 
                                                          
15 The Government of India set up a regulatory body, The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI),  in 1997, 
ratified by an ordinance in 1998, ostensibly to set rates and mediate between service providers. 
 
16 In 1999, the mobile peak tariffs were about Rs. 16 per minute, payable at both ends. They started coming down 
from 1999 but yet were around Rs. 2 at the end of 2002-03. Despite huge reductions in tariff, the growth in numbers 
was not explosive until 2002-03.  During 1999 and 2003, the mobile numbers grew from 1.2 million to 13 million. 
During 2003 and 2004, the mobile subscriber base increased by 20 million. 
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As regards those court cases, they have all been withdrawn and as of 2004, the companies 
are again investing huge amounts in expansion of networks.  Reg_1 views 2003-04 as a 
watershed year when the mobile tariffs became equal to fixed line tariffs and were affordable for 
everyone.  Refer to Figure 2 below. Reg_1 underscores the particular success of TRAI as the 
Independent Regulator which allowed the telephones to be sold at unregulated and even 
subsidized prices by the operators, thereby drastically bringing down the entry cost for 
subscriber.   Besides, with the introduction of new operators, competition in the market became 
intense, with the public sector operator and the new operator becoming fiercely aggressive. 
Speaking of the context of the limits or validity of the various ways of knowing and 
learning, Reg_1 makes the further observation that with the above developments, mobile phones 
that used to be exclusively for the elites suddenly became telephones for the working class, with 
masons, electricians, plumbers, and other workers starting to buy them. Mobile phones became 
so popular that within a year, the networks of most operators experienced bottlenecks with very 
high capacity utilization. From a level of addition of about 0.2 million telephones a month in 
April 2003, the growth jumped to 2 million telephones a month for April 2004. This growth was 
beyond anybody’s expectation, which is why, Reg_1 observed, investment in creating new 
capacities lagged behind. But the situation has changed for the better, as evidenced by the very 
aggressive investment currently underway in 2005.  What the regulators have come to realize is 
that a further impetus is essential to sustain the progress in this area. This aspect is addressed 
further under Knowing and Learning. 
From the interview data it seems as if Reg_1 was objectivist, with the suitable form of 
flexible regulatory process being acknowledged because of the behavioral scientists purposive 
look for market behavior and theories.  The author also found a development economist’s strand 
in Reg_1’s interview data that seemed to interact with the objectivist epistemology. He was 
looking for giving the right kind of regulatory response, the right answers to create a competitive 
environment.  There was also a pragmatic view for his choice of competition as a means to 
achieve privatization. First, by instituting competition, Reg_1 thought the policy makers could 
keep all privatization options open. Then, in his view, many concepts of privatization, 
competition, liberalization, and regulatory reforms are very important in today’s society.   
 
Knowing and Learning.  Reg_1 compared China and India in terms of these two 
countries population and performance parameters, taking into account certain non-telephony 
sectors also. He prepared a table that showed that at the end of 2002, the ratio (per 1000 
population) of television receiver between China and India was 3.8, cable TV 1.6, computers 3.3, 
and for automobiles 1. Refer to Table 1. Then he compared these ratios with those of fixed and 
mobile telephones to underscore that India’s performance in the telephone sector was below par 
in relation to those other items which are also capital intensive, often requiring substantial 
operating expenses.   
Reg_1 observed that when one took into account the above disparities and the 
comparative income levels and income distribution for China and India, one could see the 
possibility of a major subscriber growth in the telecom sector. The only thing needed in India 
was an environment conducive to such growth. Reg_1 hastened to add that by late 2003, growth 
in Indian telephony was evident through mobile. He then wanted to focus on the performance in 
that sector. According to Table 1, there was a huge difference between China and India’s mobile 
teledensity at the end of 2002-03.  The ratio was 16 in 2002, but due to higher relative growth of 
mobile in India, this ratio was halved to about 8 and by the end of 2004, the ratio stood at ~6. 
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From the Independent Regulator’s standpoint, Reg_1 was sure that removing the 
impediments to growth in the Indian telecom sector and facilitating competition would bring 
about a major growth stimulus in the market both from the supply as well as the demand side. 
Reg_1 was pleased to state that the expectation underlying the various policy initiatives had 
proven correct, as evidenced by an unprecedented spurt in subscriber growth as a consequence.  
In his view, if TRAI continues to expand India’s mobile networks through policy 
recommendations17 that facilitate competition and growth, India will exceed the magical figure 
of 100 million mobiles before the end of 2006.  
 
Selected Indicators China India Ratio of China/India 
Population (Billion) 1.30 1.05 1.2 
Gini Index 0.4 0.38 1.05 
Television Receiver (per 1000 population, 2002) 193 78 3.8 
Cable TV (per 1000 population, 2002) 60 37 1.6 
Computers (per 1000 population, 2002) 19 5.8 3.3 
Passenger Cars + two wheelers (per 1000 population, 
2002) 
33 34 0.97 
    
Subscribers per 1000 population 
2002 2003  
China India Ratio China India Ratio 
Mobile 161 10 16 214 27 8 
Fixed 167 38 4.4 209 40 5.2 
Total 228 48 4.8 423 67 6.3 
 
Table 1. China vs. India comparison 
 
Given that the monthly increase in subscriber base is currently slackening, Reg_1 also 
expressed caution and outlined what he thought would be needed to reinvigorate the process. As 
part of the knowing and learning, Reg_1 came to the realization that the existing progress in 
reform should be supplemented by further policy efforts. He reiterated the fact that a key factor 
triggering large growth at the end of 2003 was the sharp decrease in tariffs to relatively low and 
more affordable levels.  
 
Task Completion.  Reg_1’s final observations in the last segment serve as the point of 
departure for more thorough understanding and analysis of the potential for continued strong 
growth. He provided a chart reproduced here with his permission that showed the monthly 
subscriber additions to mobile and fixed line telephone since the beginning of 2004 (see figure 
3).  Reg_1 pointed out that after surging for a period, these monthly additions dipped low, 
suggesting the need to analyze why the growth rate had slackened. 
 
                                                          
17 Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) was created by passing the TRAI Act in February 1997. 
According to the Act, the role of TRAI is to advise the ministry on policy, solve disputes among serviced providers 
and ensure that the rules and regulations governing business are followed. It is also the agency to intervene in case 
market failures take place and protect consumer interests. 
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Source: TRAI, 2005. 
 
Figure 3. Monthly subscriber growth for mobile and fixed line telephones 
 
Reg_1 noted that TRAI, at the time of launching the expansion drive, had examined the 
size of the addressable market, which was calculated after looking at the household income of 
different class of people and after assessing what the consumers were prepared to spend on 
telecom. The addressable market was found to be 120 million. The Cellular Association of India 
conducted a similar study in 2005 and projected an addressable market of 180 million, while yet 
another service provider projected 150 million. Reg_1 pointed out that to this day, the number of 
mobiles has only reached ~40 million and further growth has slowed down. 
His understanding and knowledge tells him that the main reason behind slackening of 
growth is that most operators in large parts of the country does not have available capacity. 
Unless the operators spend substantial amounts in expanding the services, expansion is not going 
to happen. Reg_1 mentioned Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL)18 as a classic example, 
which does not have the capacity in many areas for giving more telephones. As a consequence, 
BSNL often quotes its services at a premium to the declared price. In the final analysis, the 
problem seems to be on the supply side, the demand does exist. 
                                                          
18 BSNL, formed on 1st October 2000, is a 100 percent Government of India owned Public Sector Undertaking. Its vision is to 
provide all types of telecoms services across the length and breadth of the country.  
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Reg_1 also pointed to a second reason for the slackening of growth:  the extent of 
network coverage for mobile service. In 2004, mobile networks of all operators covered ~1700 
towns out of 5200 in the country. These 1700 towns accounted for a population of 200 million, 
which has already acquired ~40 million telephones. Reg_1 highlighted that the penetration of 40 
million mobile telephones out of a population of 200 million, half of which were added within 
one year, was a very good performance. The average teledensity among the population covered 
by the network in 2004 was already 20 percent.  
Against this background, if TRAI has to achieve a target subscriber base of 100 million 
by 2006, Reg_1 argued that the coverage of the existing mobile network must be expanded. 
Under his leadership, TRAI therefore initiated a study of the investment plans of various 
operators, including the steps that it must consider to facilitate a major network expansion in the 
following years. The study revealed that the existing operators were encouraged by the huge 
demand for mobile telephones all over the country and that they were planning a very aggressive 
expansion of their networks. Reg_1 revealed that an examination of all the operators’ plans 
showed that in two years time they would cover:  
 
• 5000 towns, which would account for a population of 300 million 
• ~350,000 villages out of 607,000 villages in the country, comprising a rural 
population of 450 million.     
• Based on these figures, the population coverage by the mobile service would then be 
about 75 percent.       
 
 
 
Region 
 
 
Country 
Population covered 
by mobile signal 
(percent) 
Percentage of urban 
population in country 
(Percent) 
Cape Verde 90 53 
South Africa 93 53 
Togo 90 38 
 
Africa 
Zambia 50.5 44 
El Salvador 85 45.6 
Ecuador 86 63.6 
Guatemala 68 40 
 
Americas 
Mexico 89.9 74.7 
Jordan 99.5 78.7 Arab States 
Morocco 95 55.9 
Korea Rep. 99 84 
Malaysia 95 62 
 
Asia-Pacific 
The Philippines 70 58.6 
Azerbaijan 94 50.8 
Belarus 72 70.7 
Czech Republic  99 71 
 
Europe 
Slovak Rep. 98 56.1 
Source: ITU World Telecommunication Indicators Database 
 
Table 2. Mobile coverage beyond the urban population in selected countries, by region, 2002 
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Reg_1 explained that TRAI reviewed the mobile coverage in other countries, primarily to 
examine whether the above plans for coverage were sustainable.  He referred to an ITU study 
that showed that in 2002 countries in several regions, including Africa, America, Asia-Pacific, 
and Europe, had much higher mobile network coverage. This was by far better than India’s 20 
percent coverage in 2002 and 75 percent projected coverage likely to be in place in the next few 
years. Refer to Table 2.  
Reg_1’s position was that the extended coverage planned in India did not involve an 
extra-ordinary plan and as one of the top policy advisors in the country, he recommended that 
efforts be made to ensure that all constraints were removed so that the expansion plans could get 
underway and be completed, as planned.  
To complete the analysis, TRAI further supplemented the above analysis by an 
examination of the teledensity in other countries whose Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) per 
capita income was similar to that of India.  Reg_1 produced an international comparison chart 
(see Table 3) that showed that there were, indeed, other countries in the world with similar per 
capita income levels, but with much higher teledensity than that achieved by India. The table is 
being reproduced here with permission. This table along with the previous two tables basically 
convinced Reg_1 that if the network coverage could be increased to cover a larger portion of the 
population, India should be able to achieve teledensity of more than 20 percent very quickly.  
 
Country GNI Per Capita PPP 2002, USD Teledensity 
 2002 2003 
India 2570 4.8 6.7 
Bolivia 2300 17.22 23.81 
Georgia 2210 23.35 23.98 
Moldova 1560 19.69 23.76 
Ecuador 3130 23.08 30.32 
Source: TRAI, 2005 
 
Table 3. International comparison: India’s per capita holds higher teledensity potential 
 
Indian regulatory body, TRAI and its leadership, combined all the external analyses, their 
own comparison of India and China, and the plans of the operators, especially how they were 
formulating their investment strategies to extend their networks to provide wider coverage for a 
much larger portion of the Indian population. Based on this concerted effort, TRAI came to the 
realization that there was adequate potential for India to achieve the target of 100 million mobile 
subscribers by 2006. TRAI wanted to make sure that there was no regulatory constraint put 
before the operators to prevent them from meeting this important goal. Instead, as Reg_1 
articulated very lucidly, TRAI learned a lot and gained significant knowledge about the network 
operators’ interest in maximizing returns and how TRAI must address more complex preferences 
shaped by multiple interest group pressures.  In all this interaction of mobile operator/investors, 
TRAI, and Government throughout the study, analysis and investment cycle, Reg_1, as one of 
the top policy advisors in India, had to constantly meet the challenge posed by Kobrin (1979, pp. 
67-80) to identify “which events matter” and how “regulatory processes affect investor 
perception.”  Reg_1 summed up TRAI’s learning and knowledge base by noting that regulatory 
structures intended to bolster credibility play a critical role in securing new foreign and domestic 
investment, especially when the sector in question, such as telecommunications, is “politically 
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salient” as a result of economic, political, historical, or societal attributes that create a 
widespread public interest in its operation or outcomes.   Earlier this year when the author 
interviewed Reg_1, he affirmed that TRAI under his leadership would focus on further 
facilitating competition, tariff decline, and growth in telecoms. One important new phenomenon 
that would emerge, observed Reg_1, if “we are able to promote the investment and network 
coverage as envisaged through our analysis and planning, is that to a large extent we would be 
able to substantially make progress on our Universal Service Objective (USO) of providing 
phones on demand, and that too without incurring a subsidy through any USO Fund. This would 
help us achieve the various positive externalities that such growth generates.” This remark 
renders explicit the implicit preference of TRAI, that is, to make decisions that affect the 
behavior of interest groups in ways that are consistent with regulatory policy choices for a 
flexible and open regulatory environment conducive to sustaining advancement of 
telecommunications technology and services and through that, economic development. TRAI is 
obviously pursuing a solution-oriented path because as McDowell (1997) points out (cited in 
Bagchi, 2000): “Policy formation in India is combined with highly developed and amorphous 
consensus-building mechanisms among different state agencies…which prevent any shift in the 
short-term towards an effective nationalist technology strategy or toward a distinct break and 
movement toward a liberal policy order.” 
 
Second Memo: India, View of Synergism 
The author interviewed one of the highest ranking policy advisors in the World Bank. His 
advisory work to Governments of India, China, and several other countries on 
telecommunications sector reforms, regulatory frameworks and institutional capacity building 
allowed him to compare and contrast the reforms underway in particular counties.   To protect 
his identity, this advisor would remain anonymous and for identifying him in this paper, we 
would refer to him as Advisor 1 (Advsr_1).    
 
Synergism.  On the issue of universal access policy, Advsr_1 described the experience 
gleaned by the Bank in India, China, and several other countries from 15 years of deploying rural 
radio systems. He then offered assessments and conclusions for future plans made by India, 
which he viewed was a unique and outstanding example of accomplishing the goals of universal 
access policy without the wastage normally encountered in deliberately and mistakenly 
deploying technology in rural areas.   
Traditionally, telecom regulation in India has provided separate licensing Regimes for 
different services, e.g., fixed line, mobile, Internet, long distance telephony, etc. With the 
evolution of technology and market applications, most significantly the developments in Internet 
and mobile technologies, Advsr_1 concurs with the other industry experts that the distinctions 
traditionally applied among services are blurring and the same technology can now be used to 
offer more than one type of service. 
Thus, TRAI has recommended The Unified Licensing/ Authorization Regime through 
which service providers may be able to offer any or all services, using technology of his/her 
choice with flexibility also in terms of area of operation, greater participation of all types of 
entrepreneurs (big or small). The Government of India has agreed in November, 2003 to 
implement a Unified Licensing Regime under a two phase implementation scheme. The first 
phase, implemented from November, 2003 onwards has put in place a Unified Access Licensing 
(covering both fixed and mobile services) in India.   
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TRAI is in its final phase for determining the recommendations for the second phase, i.e. 
Unified Licensing, which will address several telecom services with separate licensing at present, 
like National Long Distance Service, International Long Distance Service, VSAT Services, 
Infrastructure Provider Services, Unified Access License, etc. These have different services 
specific terms and conditions under their licenses. It is a big challenge to bring all these services 
under a Unified Licensing Regime, while maintaining a level playing field and the objective of 
adhering to high growth of telecom services. 
However, Advsr_1 spoke very highly of the concept of Unified Licensing Regime, the 
current status of Licensing Regime in India, the various concerns that need to be addressed for 
ensuring a Unified Licensing Regime, and the way TRAI and the Government of India are 
addressing those concerns. The point that Advsr_1 was making was that rural connectivity in 
India or elsewhere would become a reality when one starts viewing the “Universal Service 
Obligation” as “Universal Service Opportunity.” The Unified Licensing Regime encourages free 
growth of new applications band services, reduces legal disputes on scope of license, ensures 
flexibility and efficient utilization of resources, ensures level playing field and easy entry, and 
encourages efficient small operators to cover rural, remote, and facility-wise less developed 
areas. In sum, USO through its synergistic approach addresses all the requirements for universal 
access requirements often levied upon the service providers, while making the approach 
profitable. He underscored India’s experiment in this regard as exemplary.  
 
Third Memo: China, View on Learning to Teamwork 
COMMENT: For Understanding of Politically Mediated Framework 
The author continued to interview Advsr_1.   Again, having advised both the 
Governments of India and China, he was able to make some observations on China’s recent 
move toward a more open, competitive environment for its industrial expansion.  In late 1940s, 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC’s) Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) 
inherited functions from the Nationalist Chinese predecessor agency and became both the 
regulator and national operating company, but other industrial branches of the government 
manufactured telecommunications equipment. Over the first three decades of the PRC, 
telecommunications generally grew at a slower pace than the rest of the economy. Until 1980, 
the percentage growth of telephone exchanges consistently trailed that of both gross production 
and national income. In most of these years (except the first decade) rural exchanges were the 
most neglected.  
In Advsr_1’s opinion, part of the reason telecommunications growth was relatively slow 
may be found in the Chinese system of enclosed work units, or danwei. For urban residents in 
particular, restrictions on place of work and movement meant relatively little need for 
communication outside of a set workplace. Manufacturing was often done on a self-reliance 
basis, with supply companies close to the assembly site. In the countryside, close-knit family ties 
in villages also lessened the need for voice telecommunication. Finally, China's international 
isolation under Mao Zedong meant phone calls outside of China were both less common and less 
necessary than for other developing nations.  
With the end of Mao’s era in 1976, however, China’s new regimes placed economic 
development at the top of their agenda and the importance of telecommunications to 
development was clearly reflected in spending decisions. Advsr_1 observed that studies of 
telecommunications and their contribution to economic growth would have lent support to the 
Chinese measures. One western study in 1981, later quoted in writing by a Chinese 
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telecommunications official, indicated that a 1 percent rise in the number of telephones per 100 
population could contribute to as much as a 3 percent increase in gross domestic product. The 
study found that the telephone's role in improving the organization of economic activity led to 
the subsequent growth. Accordingly, under China’s reformers, growth in several areas of 
telecommunications exceeded that of the national economy over most of the first decade of 
economic change.  
Advsr_1 articulated several factors that inspired greater attention to telecommunications 
development. The death of Mao and the subsequent turn toward "market socialism" meant a 
greater need for rational and coordinated supply systems. Worker mobility also increased, and 
the danwei structure began to weaken. Rural migration to the cities increased, and foreign 
investors came to attract low-wage labour to new factories in many areas of the country. All of 
these developments required a more developed system for both business and personal 
communication. The government took several measures to address the perceived need.  
For example, until the Chinese reformers arrived, revenue from telecommunications 
operations was turned over to the central government, and the industry received a set percentage 
of the budget (no matter what the receipts) for development. But beginning in 1980, the 
government listed posts and telecommunications as a preferential construction item and allowed 
the industry to use funds derived from its operations at national as well as local and collective 
levels to supplement its development. By 1986, some 50 percent of the industry's revenue came 
from this "self-raised" capital. 
In 1984, then vice-premier Li Peng took control of the Leading Group for the 
Revitalization of the Electronics Industry. Under this group's guidance, telecommunication was 
put at a higher place on the government's agenda. The following year, MPT submitted a fifteen-
year plan for telecommunications development to the State Planning Commission. The goals 
were ambitious and were met ahead of schedule.  
To support this trend, MPT policies, along with the growth of township and village 
enterprises (TVEs), gave preference to the less developed regions of the country.19 Additionally, 
there were other telecommunications policies that were also key to the rapid change20. 
Advsr_1 added that structural reorganization of the industry was also conducive to its 
development. Before 1990, the provincial offices took direct orders from the MPT; since 1990, 
however, the provincial branches have had autonomy in getting equipment, making investments, 
planning, and accounting for their performance. (Refer to John Ure, Note 19) 
The resulting decentralization has added to the industry's efficiency and the Chinese 
began to realize the benefits of ending control by a state run monopoly and moving toward a 
system of open competition in the sector. Several government institutions are still involved in the 
policy development and implementation for the sector.  That involvement also creates problems 
                                                          
19 The MPT officials claim that the ministry had a set ratio of investment, one that channeled funds from the more 
developed coastal provinces to less developed areas such as Tibet and Qinghai (Ure, 1995).  
 
Advsr_1  and several other China experts in the World Bank, however, think that even to this day some provinces 
continue to lag behind the wealthier coastal areas. 
 
20 In 1988, the "Three 90 Percents" strategy was inaugurated to benefit the MPT's drive toward development. This 
policy stated that (1) 90 percent of central government loans for telecommunications did not have to be repaid; (2) 
provincial telecommunications authorities could keep 90 percent of their taxable profits; and (3) the MPT could 
keep 90 percent of its foreign currency earnings from international traffic. (Ibid.) The policy was quite successful 
and was repealed by late 1995, as it was seen as no longer necessary. 
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of industrial rivalry, the overlapping jurisdictions of regulation and operation within the MPT 
and problems that foreign investors face in entering the operations part of the 
telecommunications sector. 
The author interviewed the former Assistant US Trade Representative and a senior 
representative of the US-International Chamber of Commerce, who shared their experiences in 
setting up China Unicorm. Again, to protect their identity, these advisors would remain 
anonymous and for identifying them in this paper, we would refer to them as Advisor 2 
(Advsr_2) and Advisor 3 (Advsr_3). Following their insightful analyses of the international 
commercial diplomacy, the author also reviewed other secondary data sources to create a special 
case study on China Unicom, which highlights the problems and issues that Advsr_1 mentioned 
in his remarks.   
 
Case Study: China Unicom.  In addition to the reforms noted above, in the mid-1980s 
the Chinese leadership had made moves to dilute the strength of powerful industrial ministries21. 
As mentioned in the preceding section, MPT was the telecommunications monopoly and held 
both operating and regulatory powers. There were two pressures to break the state monopoly on 
telecommunications:  
 
• International pressures came from the:  
• World Bank, a key source of revenue 
• US Trade Representatives Office  
• US-International Chamber of Commerce.  
 
All these institutions encouraged the broadening of market forces. The World Bank also 
wanted to see the spread of telecommunications to rural areas in China, parts of the country 
which the MPT was less eager to develop. 
Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI), which had manufactured equipment for the 
industry but now wanted a piece of the operations. New minister Hu Qili led the fight to create a 
rival to MPT operations control.  
In course of time, the ministries of Electric Power Industry and Railways plus thirteen 
other partners joined the MEI to officially open China United Telecommunications Corporation 
(usually called Unicom) in July 1994. MEI, lacking its own telecommunications lines or wireless 
systems, favored the alliance with the Power and Railway ministries, both of which had 
substantial private telecommunications networks22.  
The Unicom members together represent a potentially powerful array of stakeholders 
meant to challenge the MPT monopoly. However, this is not to say that government control is 
going to go away.  A document released in the second week of January 2005 spelled out the role 
communist party members inside big corporations should play in company management, 
including serving as board members and choosing key executives. (“China Orders Bigger Role,” 
                                                          
21 For guidance in transforming the MPT, in 1988 the Chinese Academy of Sciences was asked by the State 
Commission for Economic Restructuring to send scholars to the U.S. to find how the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) managed the telecommunications landscape following the breakup of AT&T. The investigators 
particularly noted the effects of separate government regulation and private corporate operation. 
 
22 The Chinese military, however, which also had its own wireless communication system, was absent from the list 
of shareholders. 
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2005) Bob Broadfoot of the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy in Hong Kong says, “The 
party has really never gotten out of business.” (“China Orders Bigger Role”) He pointed out that 
one sign of the party’s determination to keep a strong say in management came in 2004, when 
the government ordered top executives at three major telecom operators , including Unicom, to 
swap jobs. That was not a simple industry shake-up, rather a party shake-up, as Broadfoot saw it.   
A vice president for AT&T Corp. in Hong Kong, Steve Lowe, who oversees the company’s 
China operations, says that …the Chinese market will remain very regulated, very 
controlled…We are frustrated. (Buckman, 2004) 
Some of the big outfits like MCI and Singapore Telecommunications Ltd. currently offer 
only limited services in China because the market is simply “too closed,”  says David Lim, 
managing director of SingTel’s greater China operations. Competition or market-liberalization, 
as is known in other parts of the world has not happened yet in China. It is in this context that 
Advsr_1, Advsr_2, and Advsr_3 remarked that China is the only country where competition is 
witnessed not among the service providers operating in the Chinese market, but among more 
powerful shareholders coming from the influential electronics, railways, and power ministries.  
In sum, two things stand out in China's context. First, a coalition for restructuring 
telecommunications with access to state's decision-making exists. The reform coalition consists 
of a powerful group which includes, as noted above, the major manufacturing and user 
ministries, large national users, local governments and interest groups and international 
equipment suppliers23 and service operators. Restructuring has, in turn, mostly benefited the 
coalition partners.24 This is evident from the networks available to powerful ministries, 
equipment deals for Multi National Corporations, and availability of advanced services for users 
in export-oriented areas such as Guangdong and Fujian. 
 
 
Analysis 
 
China is still at a relatively early stage of the regulatory and institutional transformation 
of its telecommunications sector and thus cannot make unrealistic commitments to rapid open 
market access and national treatment. The whole topic concerns massively shifting ground.  
Appendix A is an attempt by the author to provide an early mapping of the institutional evolution 
of China’s regulators and how these regulators address the ideational component to economic 
regulation, i.e., the issue of telecoms competition and industry structure. Given that China is in 
the midst of fashioning its own privatization, liberalization, and competition timetable for 
telecommunications, it is worth noting that a number of developing countries, including India, 
has already met and is on the way to exceeding WTO commitments, notably the Basic 
                                                          
23 The PRC permits foreign companies to sell advanced equipment to the country and to create joint ventures to 
manufacture products within the nation's borders. Large corporations like AT&T (now Lucent Technologies), 
Motorola, Siemens, NEC (Nippon Electronics Corporation) and other companies have taken advantage of this 
policy. However, the Chinese government does not allow foreign companies to actually operate telecommunications 
systems. 
 
24 AT&T entered a Chinese joint venture four years ago, before Beijing joined the WTO, to provide Internet and 
data services to companies. Steve Lowe, a vice president for AT&T Corp. in Hong Kong who oversees the 
company’s China operations, says it has been successful, even though AT&T owns only 25 percent and the venture 
can provide only limited services in one city, Shanghai. 
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Agreement on Telecommunications. In Appendix A, India has been singled out for special 
consideration.  
Among the countries that committed to moderately restricted privatization, liberalization, 
and competition plans, the example of India offers a number of useful parallels to the case of 
China.25 While China has made more rapid progress than India in expanding its 
telecommunications infrastructure, both countries are classified as developing countries on the 
strength of existing teledensity and numbers of main telephone lines per 100 inhabitants. Both 
countries have been making a slow shift from Ministry regulated and operated 
telecommunications services to structural separation of regulation and operation. The 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) is a newly formed entity. So is the 
Ministry of information Industry (MII) in China. Both countries have taken their first steps 
toward privatization, liberalization, competition by implementing policies in fixed line and in 
cellular telephony. Both countries have pursued regional, provincial policies, in India’s case by 
licensing duopolies in each of twenty service areas that essentially correspond to provincial 
boundaries. In China, the PTAs have given rise to similar results. 
With these comparisons in mind, Appendix A showing the Chinese and Indian 
commitments provides useful background for comparing and analyzing the basis and the degree 
and extent to which a country could commit to independence of regulatory functions and opening 
to other market players.  In what follows, we review China’s approach to telecommunications 
reform based on broad themes and issues organized  around the intersection of culture, society, 
history, politics and economics in implementing the agenda of reform, with comparative 
reference to India’s experience. 
 
China 
There has been a concerted effort in China to develop new regulatory institutions 
responsible for setting conditions for the telecoms market.  Indeed, Appendix A identifies the 
sequence of events that clearly indicate that the PRC government is smack-dab in the middle of 
an intensive effort to mold the foundations of its regulatory state, and is undergoing what Marc 
Eisner (2000) calls “regulatory regime change:” 
 “A regime emerges when new regulatory policies are initiated in several regulatory issue 
areas … and are combined with significant institutional changes.  The policy initiatives 
commonly display set of a related goals [sic] which transcends the specific problems of a given 
industry.  Moreover, the new administrative procedures often establish a common role for 
economic interests in the definition and implementation of policy.” p. 3 
As mentioned earlier, the whole topic concerns massively shifting ground in China, 
including institutional change in the regulatory arena.  Appendix A summarizes the facts that 
economic interests surrounding this institutional change are rapidly shifting, too, as the country’s 
drive to create domestically and globally competitive telecom industry intensifies. The new 
regime contains elements –institutional and ideational – that are consistent with the global wave 
of regulatory reform.  Yet unique, if unsurprising, elements arise not only from the specific 
historical-institutional context of the telecoms sector, but more generally from the continued 
central role of state-ownership, the revenue imperative of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and 
the development goals of the Chinese government.  China’s regime is therefore a mixed bag, as 
well as evolving at a rapid pace. 
                                                          
25 For more detailed discussion, see Kaushik (1997) and Jain (1997). 
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Ideationally, there is a commitment in China to break up the state-owned incumbent 
monopolies.  The goal is to ensure greater productivity by promoting some market competition in 
telecoms by promoting market entry by a handful of officially licensed firms.  However, rather 
than simply creating a level playing field for any firm that wishes to enter and exit, the Chinese 
government is actively structuring the competition.  Appendix A summarizes that the 
government has promoted a pattern that breaks up the monopoly incumbent, China Telecom, into 
five dominant, state-owned firms, and in some situations permitted a few more marginal players 
but not supported them.26 There is much discussion of the need for markets and competition, but 
they must be stable. 
There also has been a greater effort at codification of rules.  The subject of much of the 
earlier codification was “social regulation” needed to achieve social policy such as continuing 
the inflow of revenues from large state enterprises, as well as the provision of universal services 
(standard worldwide in telecommunications).  Although the universal services commitment is 
explicit in discussions of telecom development programs, the need for the Chinese state 
incumbents to help serve social aims such as employment has not often been discussed but is 
nevertheless important.  One important result of this imperative is that, for the Chinese 
regulators, it is impossible to not care which players survive and how well they do – hence the 
revenue imperative.   
To support these regulatory aims, Appendix A summarizes how the Chinese government 
has attempted to make some institutional changes.  New institution includes substantially 
revised line ministry – notably the Ministry of Information Industry (MII).   
Also, there are moves to generate “independence” for regulators through the effort to 
separate the government regulatory function from business.  This addresses the classic problem 
of “capture” of regulators by business.  While this separation has been on the agenda for many 
years, an additional major step was made in the 1998 reorganization of the State Council in the 
effort to reorganize functions and eliminate the line ministry or reduce it to bureau.27      
Independence is circumscribed in three main ways. First, the regulators are not 
“independent” of policy-making bodies. The policy importance of the social-revenue imperative 
dictates the need to maintain political oversight over the regulators.  Hence, the role of 
comprehensive agencies [notably State Development Planning Commission (SDPC)/ State 
Development & Reform Commission (SDRC)] as well as political bodies (State Council and 
Party) remains significant. China’s reforming regulatory system sustains much governmental 
control. 
                                                          
26 As Table A-1 referenced, the PRC permits foreign companies to sell advanced equipment to the country and to 
create joint ventures to manufacture products within the nation’s borders. The Chinese government, however, 
prohibits foreign companies from actually operating telecommunications systems. Foreign phone companies such as 
Ameritech, Deutsche Telecom, Sprint and others are thereby limited in their participation. As noted in the table, the 
Chinese preferred to keep revenue from operating these systems to themselves.  
 
27 It was beyond the scope of Table A-1 to list all the details, but the massive reorganization of the State Council 
was carried out by Zhu Rongji upon becoming premier in 1998.  That reorganization created the Ministry of 
Information Industry (MII), which oversees telecommunications policy and regulation, as a merger between the 
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) and Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI).  It became a 
“superministry” and also was marked to become the “independent regulator” for telecom.  A part of the impetus for 
the formation of MII was to try to break apart the regulator, previously MPT, from the incumbent, China Telecom, 
as MPT had shown complete favoritism for China Telecom over the competitor formed in 1994, China Unicom. 
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Second, there is a fundamental problem of ensuring that new institutions actually have 
authority.  Just because there is a new regulatory body does not mean the regulated (or other 
former regulators) will pay attention to it.  Moreover, other government bodies that previously 
may have had a regulatory role may not have been explicitly excluded from the mix (so that a 
new regulator is just one player in the system of fragmented authoritarianism) or may simply 
refuse to relinquish rights to have a say on certain issues.   
Third, and related, ownership rights over state-owned enterprises are not clear.28  What 
does it mean for MII to be an “independent regulator” of China Telecom, which is “100% 
owned” by the Ministry of Finance?  How are the jurisdictional lines maintained?  Thus far, not 
very well. 
These points suggest that considerable “regulatory risk” remains in the Chinese system.  
Foreign players planning to enter the Chinese market often express their fear about the lack of 
clear and concise legislation governing the sector, regulatory implementation and enforcement, 
true competition, and regulatory independence. 
 
India 
India and China are pursuing diametrically opposed strategies across most salient 
dimensions of national telecoms strategy. Appendix A chronicles the evolution of the two 
different strategies and highlights their contrasts. What's the fastest route to economic 
development? Welcome Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), says China, and most policy experts 
agree. But a comparison with long-time laggard India suggests that FDI is not the only path to 
prosperity.  
Since 1991, the Government of India (GOI) has introduced a series of economic reforms, 
including policies of privatization, competition, liberalization and regulatory independence in the 
telecoms sector. The broad thrust of the new policies was a move away from the centralized 
allocation of resources in key sectors, including telecoms, by the government to allocation by 
market forces. Private participation in economic development has emerged as an alternative to 
the state-oriented development strategy in the reform period. 
The shift in attitude, summarized in Appendix A, was a belated realization by 
government of the poor performance of the telecoms enterprise and the new policies were 
instituted to bring market discipline and public accountability to the performances of the national 
telecom enterprise, the Department of Telecommunication (DoT), by broad basing their 
management and ownership patterns. Also, the table describes the fact that after a decade of 
reforms, restraints to competition such as state monopolies and protective measures and controls 
are being replaced by relatively more competitive and de-regulated open telecoms environment. 
In setting up the specific independent regulator, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of 
India (TRAI), the government has actively coordinated between agencies even in the early stages 
of competition and taken an active role in redefining their position as regulators in the previous 
policy regime. Appendix A chronicles how the sequencing and timing of establishing TRAI has 
depended on domestic compulsions and needs.  
One particular urgent need that existed in India in the late 1980’s-early 1990’s timeframe 
was to address legacy issues so that commonplace and relevant consumer applications could 
emerge and radical social and economic changes could be effected. Some likely applications 
                                                          
28 Although discussion of property rights in academic and policy literature is often treated normatively –i.e., private 
property is preferable – the point here is that ambiguity about who owns and has use/profit rights to assets (whether it 
be “the state” or private owners or something else) lays the groundwork for ambiguous rules. 
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included acceleration of literacy and education rates in the general public and consequent 
improvement in real income, and job creation through encouragement of viable small 
entrepreneurial business enterprises at the grassroots level. In the late 1980’s, the prevailing 
thinking was that these enterprises would principally operate in the services sector, expanding it 
to the manufacturing. From the government point of view, this would result in a rapid widening 
of the direct tax base without necessitating a corresponding rise in government staffing. Income 
from direct telecom revenues was not expected to be much, thus reinforcing the government 
policy of expanding capacity through the private sector.  
Appendix A traces the beginning of the process by which India spawned a number of 
telecoms companies that now compete internationally with the best that Europe and the United 
States have to offer. Moreover, today, many of these firms are in the most cutting edge, 
knowledge-based industries. In 2003, the Forbes 200, an annual ranking of the world’s best small 
companies, included 13 Indian firms but just four from mainland China. But when it comes to 
gross domestic product (GDP) figures and other headline numbers, India is still no match for 
China. 
However, the statistics tell only the macroeconomic story. At the micro level, things look 
quite different. By relying primarily on organic growth, the Indian policy experts have been 
following a path that is today beginning to deliver more sustainable progress, even though the 
path is different from China’s FDI-driven approach.  
The fact that India chose to build from ground up while China is still pursuing a top-
down approach reflects their contrasting political systems: India is a democracy, and China is 
not. But the different strategies are also a function of history. China’s Communist Party came to 
power in 1949 intent on eradicating private ownership, which it quickly did. India, on the other 
hand, developed a softer brand of socialism, Fabian Socialism, which aimed to mitigate the 
social ills that capitalism caused. However, as Appendix A documents, that did not prevent 
entrepreneurship (e.g., the creation of the Center fort the Development of Telematics [C-DoT]) 
from flourishing where the long arm of the state could not reach. 
Competition policy covers all aspects of government actions that affect the conditions 
under which firms compete and is considered as complex in its intentions and effects. Appendix 
A records that one of the major objectives of the National Telecom Policy (NTP) announced in 
1994 was to “Transform in a time bound manner, the telecommunications sector to greater 
competitive environment in both urban and rural areas providing equal opportunities and level 
playing field for all entrepreneurs”. Prior to NTP 99 this did not appear to be an explicit 
objective of the reform process. Private sector entry was to be tolerated only in order to add to 
the government’s investment in the telecom sector. This was apparent from the fact that the 
liberalization of the telecom sector in India was initiated with several restrictions on entry. Then, 
the TRAI was set up “to facilitate competition, … to provide a level playing field for fair 
competition among the public and private operators and to give further content to universal 
service obligation.” (Economic Survey, 1997, p. 169)   Then, following TRAI’s assessment of 
expected levels of competition in cellular mobile services and their fast growth, the Indian 
government decided to follow an approach of free and unlimited entry.  The comparison in 
Appendix A indicates that the rough-and-tumble Indian telecoms market has moved slowly and 
steadily up the value chain and has been able to capitalize on entrepreneurial energies and 
innovations.  
China’s leadership is still not willing to relinquish its control over the largest SOEs such 
as China Telecom.  Instead, the government has ferociously protected them from competition. 
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More than a few promising businesses have been destroyed this way. This bias against 
homegrown firms is widely acknowledged.29
In the political economy context of India, not only is entrepreneurship thriving in India 
but democracy, a tradition of entrepreneurship, and a decent legal system have given India the 
underpinnings necessary for free enterprise to flourish.  
Appendix A covers many more specific telecoms privatization, competition, and 
regulatory independence issues.  It is not necessary to discuss each area separately. The real issue 
is that India and China have pursued radically different development strategies, and Appendix A 
notes that India is not outperforming China overall, but it is doing better in certain key areas. 
China is keeping the doors to foreign telecommunications companies tightly shut.  The 
government still maintains a ministerial monopoly of communications services, restricts foreign 
investment and control and has, until recently, been slow to expand service to rural areas. 
Privatization has not been allowed and does not appear to be in the offing for the Chinese 
telecoms industry in which competition is primarily between government entities, vying for 
authority.  
Countries often use privatization and liberalization in the telecommunications sector to 
signal their seriousness about instituting pro-market reforms. Unless important reform measures 
are further enhanced, China’s program may retard the sector’s growth and through that the 
country’s economic developmental goals. India’s success confirms that the telecommunications 
sector offers substantial positive externalities for the economy as a whole30 and that kind of 
success may enable India to catch up with and perhaps even overtake China in the economic 
development ladder. Should that prove to be the case, it will only demonstrate the importance of 
particular country political, developmental and social circumstances that foster entrepreneurship 
and through that long-term economic development; it will also show the limits of the FDI-
dependent approach that China is pursuing.    
 
 
Conclusions and Future Issues 
 
The analysis presented in the preceding section reveals that privatization and 
competition had a large positive impact on telecommunications performance in both India 
and China and that more reforms were associated with more performance gains.  
Full privatization, which gave private owners control rights in India, were much 
more effective in improving performance than partial privatization, which left control 
rights in the hands of bureaucrats in the Indian Department of Telecommunication. The 
Indian case history also suggests that privatization works best when there is competition 
that limits the market power of the incumbent(s). Competition could thus be a complement 
to privatization. More recent research by the author includes a vector of these 
telecommunications reforms (i.e., reform measures). 
India also experienced faster network expansion and improvements in both labor 
and total factor productivities (TFP). Because of the greater incentives to innovate and save 
costs, the Indian telecommunication sector, particularly the mobile service sector, 
                                                          
29 A Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Report issued in 2000 concluded that because of longstanding prejudices 
and mistaken beliefs, private and individual enterprises have a lower political status and are discriminated against in 
numerous policies and regulations. “The legal, policy, and market environment is unfair and inconsistent.” 
 
30 For more understanding of these externalities, refer to Roller & Waverman (2001). 
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experienced higher TFP after privatization. The increase in competitive pressure was 
associated with rising investment, teledensities, decreasing price for a three-minute off-
peak hour local cellular phone call cost, and similar other performance measures. Given the 
lack of telecommunications infrastructure in many developing countries, one of the main 
yardsticks in measuring the success of telecommunications reforms should, therefore, be 
the pace of network and services expansion and the concomitant lowering of price for a 
three-minute off-peak hour local cellular phone call cost. The number of mobile phone 
lines per 100 inhabitants (Mobile_Densitry) and the price of a three-minute off-peak hour 
local cellular phone call cost (CELLCALLCOST) are, therefore, good candidates for 
outcome measures. 
The Indian and Chinese case histories provide useful evidence of complementarities 
between privatization and competition in deepening network penetration.  China did not 
allow any privatization, which should lead one to investigate further the country specific 
effects. 
In both case histories, there were references to a time trend to gauge the effects of 
technological changes, which, as the Indian case suggests, were statistically significant 
given the rapid adoption of new technology in the mobile sector in the late 1990’s. The 
country fixed effects are key parameters to represent country-specific heterogeneity, which 
influences both policy changes and sector performance. Again, the more recent research by 
the author specifies a measure to account for time trend. Additionally, the country 
economic environment, as we saw in both India and China, affect the demand and supply 
of telecommunications services and hence telecommunications outcomes.  
Figure 4 illustrates how all these measures and variables that emerge from this 
research phase are related to each other, and Appendix B catalogs them for further 
refinement.  
The most important conclusion to draw from this paper is that there is solid 
evidence that privatization “generally” works for privatizing economies as a whole. Case in 
point is the Indian telecommunications privatization: it has resulted in increased 
productivity and reduced employment; and proved that the fears of negative overall effects 
at the economy level are not necessarily justified. As one discusses privatization, the point 
to stress is that the benefits of privatizations depend on market institutions being in place. 
For instance, India vigorously instituted property rights protection and the rule-of-law, 
imposed budget constraints, increased competition, and attempted transparency in 
governance, thereby reaping the largest benefits in a very small amount of time. The 
biggest concern that many foreign investors have about China is that appropriate 
institutions are not in place and consequently, these foreign investors anticipate less 
dramatic performance improvements for the of the Chinese economy. Privatization in 
China is slow in coming, however, foreign investors are making positive impacts in that 
even partial foreign equity ownership, particularly in the equipment manufacturing sector, 
exhibits the highest productivity bidding process. China is carefully allocating the foreign 
equity ownership in the equipment manufacturing business. China’s strategy seems to be 
geared toward receiving a high price for all joint venture/co-production agreements because 
it is important for fiscal reasons.  Potentially, such high prices would generate other 
favorable impacts: they might ensure the political legitimacy of emerging private property 
rights and the continued evolution of reforms that foreign investors so eagerly seek in 
China.  
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Figure 4. Relationship of the key measures/variables 
 
To translate the above observations into policymakers’ language, the lessons from 
this paper’s privatization research are:   
 
• Privatization can deliver substantial benefits. In some cases productivity doubles; in 
other cases productivity can increase by single percentage points. 
• Privatization usually causes either no change or reduction in employment. Based on 
experience, it seems that most privatizing countries manage this problem reasonably 
well. 
• Policy trade-offs are better handled when privatization is attained under transparency 
and openness to foreign investors. Often there are pressures from insiders and 
domestic investors against allowing participation by foreign entities, along with 
strong nationalistic fervor. However, disallowing foreign ownership always lowers 
privatization prices, with attendant decreases in post-privatization efficiency. 
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• Privatization works well, if good institutions are present. China and Russia are not 
outliers. China’s growth has come from private sector development and the empirical 
evidence from China suggests that non-privatizing reform measures, such as market 
liberalization and increase use of incentives can improve the efficiency of SOE. 
However, foreign investors opening up beach-heads in China argue that these reforms 
would yield greater dividends if the government allowed privatization. Russia lacks 
good institutions, however, the demand for institutions has started to emerge. The 
pace is slower than expected, mostly due to macroeconomic instability and/or 
inequality and illegitimacy of property rights. Many Russia experts argue that there is 
no better alternative because openness to foreigners is not an acceptable political 
position attitude. 
 
Avenues for Further Research 
The foregoing observations reveal much that has been learned about the 
effectiveness of privatization as a political and economic policy. However, there are several 
important areas that need further investigation. In particular, there are three aspects of 
privatization that need better analysis for public policy reasons: 
 
• First, researchers need to conduct more thorough research on the sequencing and 
staging of privatization and document if reforms other than government divestiture 
can be a substitute or precursor for privatization. Until such policy findings are 
identified, the interactions between several different policy options are established, 
and conclusively documented, launching large-scale privatization programs remains a 
leap of faith.  
• The second vital area of research concerns the labor economics of privatization 
programs. The question all too often raised is: do most privatization programs cost 
SOE employee jobs? How effective are the employee training/retraining programs in 
terms of dealing with worker redundancies? Can we put any credence to the idea that 
privatization creates more jobs economy-wide than it destroys? These questions are 
vitally important to policy makers, interesting in their own right, and should be 
conclusively researched and documented in order that responsible policy makers can 
make sensible choices and not just “bet their economies” on a rapid and essentially 
irreversible privatization program.     
• Finally, in terms of the current state of the world, one should address the question: 
what role can privatization play in equipping countries to meet the challenges posed 
by major economic forces such as globalization and the rapid growth of information-
based business? Technological breakthroughs are transforming the global 
telecommunications industry, with privatized telecommunications companies playing 
a definite role at the forefront of this revolution.  Can one say that this most dynamic 
of industries would have been able to grow as rapidly under the previous state 
ownership model? Beyond that, one can also look at other industries and ask related 
questions, such as how important will privatization be for the global oil and gas 
industry’s development in the future, or what about the energy-based utilities that are 
now being impacted by technological and regulatory changes like those that impacted 
telecommunications in the late 1990s? Then there is the question of influencing the 
developing countries: how should they structure privatization programs to most 
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effectively attract foreign direct investment from multinational companies? These are 
pertinent questions that can and should be answered using economic analysis tools. 
There isn’t any research more intrinsically interesting to economists than the one that 
analyzes the optimal role of government in the business of nations.  
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Appendix A. Comparative Analysis of Competitiveness of Telecommunications Industry in India and China 
 
Directions/Trends/Descriptions India China 
India 
Attribute 
Aspect References Aspect References  
China 
1. Intersection of 
Society, Culture,  
and Politics 
1947 
? There were 
only 321 switching 
centers (telephone 
exchanges) in 
urban areas and a 
teledensity of 0.25 
phones per 1,000 
people. 
Until Mid-1980s 
? All aspects of 
the telecoms sector 
under government 
control thru the 
Ministry of Posts 
and Telegraph as a 
national monopoly. 
? Telephones 
centered around 
the 
urban and 
metropolitan areas 
and rural coverage 
lacking because of 
“the perception that 
phones were a 
luxury and rather 
than essential 
infrastructure for 
efficient 
administration of 
government and 
industry.”31
Mody, B. (1995). 
State 
Consolidation 
through 
liberalization of 
Telecom; Journal 
of 
Communication 
45(4), page 109-
110 
 
 
 
 
 
Ibid. p.111 
 
Also, refer to: 
 
? McDowell, 
Stephen D. 
(1997). 
Globalization, 
Liberalization 
and Policy 
Change: A 
Political 
Economy of 
India’s 
Communications 
Sector, 
Macmillan’s 
Press, p. 128. 
1949 
? There were 
only 300,000 
phones for about 
550 million 
people, i.e., one 
phone for every 
1,800 residents. 
In rural areas, 
there were only 
about 30,000 
phones for every 
18,000 Chinese. 
The People’s 
Republic of 
China's Ministry 
of Posts and 
Telecommunicati
ons (MPT) 
inherited 
functions from 
the Nationalist 
Chinese 
predecessor 
agency and 
became the 
country's 
monopoly "Posts 
and 
Telecommunicati
ons 
Administration" 
(PTA).33 
For early history 
of the industry, 
refer to:  
? Dangdai 
zhongguo de 
youdian shiye 
(China's current 
Posts and 
Telecommunicati
ons Industry). 
(1993). Beijing: 
Dangdai 
zhongguo 
chubanshe, pp. 
9-18.  
? China 
Telecommunicati
ons Construction 
(hereafter CTC), 
vol. 1, no. 4 
(November/Dece
mber 1989), p. 
13.  
 
 
 
 
 
For details on this 
type of 
communication, 
refer to:  
? T. C. Yu, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public pressure mounted and 
Parliamentary questions were raised 
about the: 
? Inadequacy of the level of 
service 
? High prices  
? Unavailability of telephones. 
 
Industry experts, at this stage, 
argued that the different 
technological needs of the postal 
Most of the telephones in the countryside 
were for military commanders, leaving 
virtually no telephones for residential 
use. 
MPT was both the regulator and national 
operating company, but other industrial 
branches of the government 
manufactured telecommunications 
equipment.  
 
Early development of the 
telecommunications industry in China 
was tied closely to the growth of the 
nation's economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31 Stephen McDowell in his treatise of political economy of the communications sector in India observes: Telecommunications technology and services did not 
assume a high national priority until the Seventh Economic Development Plan (1985-90). It is widely claimed the telecommunications were seen by policy makers 
up until the early 1980’s as luxury services not essential to essential to economic growth. But there might have been other reasons, too. An Indian commentator 
argued in 1981 that the urban bias was dictated by the fact that: The direct and tangible benefits of telecommunications expansion in rural areas being small, there has 
been a tendency so far to leave those areas alone and concentrate on urban areas, which give handsome returns to capital. Until 1980’s, the essential components of 
telecommunication service policies, where a telephone network was not in place, were policies for producing and purchasing network equipment, for funding 
network expansion, and for organizing public organizations to provide telecommunication services. 
 
32 The ministry attempted to damp down the criticism, however, telecommunications remained a focal point of public debates between 1980-1983. McDowell 
writes: “The importance of telecommunications had risen in the administration of Prime Minister India Gandhi in the early 1980’s and was accentuated in the new 
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Directions/Trends/Descriptions India China 
India 
Attribute 
Aspect References Aspect References  
China 
1981 
? A high-
powered 
government 
committee 
reviewed 
organizational 
issues at the 
Ministry of Posts 
and Telegraph 
? The committee 
recommended: 
1. Splitting the 
MPT into two 
divisions 
2. Immediate 
importation of 
100,000 
telephone 
instruments 
3. Collaboration 
with foreign 
telecom 
companies.  
? Despite 
everything, the 
telecommunication
 
? Ibid, p. 
132. 
? Ibid, p. 133 
? Ibid, p. 140 
 
? Early days 
of communism: 
The number of 
telephones was 
limited, but there 
were methods of 
"mass 
communication,:” 
including radio, 
film, newspapers 
and dazibao (big-
character 
posters).  
? These 
forms of 
transmitting 
information were 
naturally 
unidirectional, 
i.e., from 
government 
propagandists to 
the masses.  
? For political 
purposes, 
however, these 
methods, 
coupled with the 
Frederick. (1963) 
“Communications 
and Politics in 
Communist 
China,” 
Communications 
and Political 
Development, ed. 
Lucian Pye. 
Princeton: 
Princeton 
University Press, 
pp. 259-97. 
and telecommunications activities 
necessitated a break and that such a 
break would allow greater attention 
to be paid to telecommunications 
role in development. 
 
 
In the face of mounting criticism, the 
bureaucrats began defending 
themselves.  McDowell quoted the 
chief telecom bureaucrat, the 
Secretary of Communications, S. K. 
Ghosh, as saying in 1983, “Telecom 
investments deserved the priority 
given the economic fall-outs in other 
sectors, but surpluses were being 
siphoned off to cover the postal 
deficit.” Refer to McDowell, p. 133 
 
? Birth of the Department of 
Telecom (DoT) 
 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi initiated 
the liberalization of the telecom 
sector by demonopolising the 
telecom equipment-manufacturing 
sector in 1985, allowing private firms 
to manufacture telephones. 
Meanwhile, DoT licensed switching 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
government of Rajiv Gandhi who became prime minister in 1984. The telecommunication policy model that emerged at this time in India, combined some 
liberalization of imports of computer and information technology with the allocation of more state resources to develop national telecommunications equipment 
research and development capabilities.” (see McDowell 1997, P. 136.) 
 
33 Developing countries tend to follow a distinct pattern: First, they leave overall control of the telecoms sector in the hands of a central government agency, one that 
is sometimes combined with postal services to create the generically named "Posts and Telecommunications Administration" (PTA) . The PTA is usually at a 
ministry or executive agency level in the political hierarchy, and is the monopoly operator and very often the monopoly regulator and equipment manufacturer. 
Through the PTA, the government can ensure uniform standards, coordinated purchases of equipment and regulated development in all parts of the nation. The 
existence of a PTA, however, also means that competition is suppressed, and the key industry is usually managed by public bureaucrats rather than by private 
entrepreneurs. Secondly, the monopoly agency, through protectionism, tends to shut out foreign competition. Often, issues of national security are raised to defend 
this position; in fact, what is behind this smokescreen is the lucrative income to be gained by operating a communications system (and sometimes manufacturing its 
equipment). Finally, developing nations mostly focus on urban growth in their initial stages of telecommunications deployment. Large cities are natural targets: 
residents are wealthier and better sources of revenue, infrastructure and physical layout for installing wires and cellular transmission equipment are more hospitable, 
and urban areas serve as showcases of the nation's development. Only conscious efforts by government regulators can encourage the development of universal 
nationwide service.  
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India 
Attribute 
Aspect References Aspect References  
China 
s bureaucracy was 
not convinced:  
1. The MPT was 
more 
concerned 
with 
defending its 
turf against 
the newly 
formed 
Department 
of 
Electronics.32 
1986 
? A long sought 
re-organization was 
undertaken to split 
the public postal 
and telecom 
operations into 
separate 
departments. 
?  
introduction and 
rapid spread of 
television in the 
1970s and 
1980s, were 
sufficient to 
convey 
information; the 
lack of 
telephones was 
no hindrance to 
keeping people 
informed of the 
news and policy 
statements that 
the government 
considered vital. 
technology from various foreign 
firms. 
 
Rajiv Gandhi also gave a thrust to 
national development of 
telecommunications equipment by 
hiring a non resident Indian engineer 
in 1984 to start the Center for the 
Development of Telematics (C-DoT). 
The goal: To design an indigenous 
digital telecommunications switch, 
which would suit the  
C-DoT was to produce smaller rural 
exchange switches as well as a new 
bigger capacity switch, which would 
form the core technology for the 
geographical expansion of 
telecommunications services.  
 
This possibility of indigenous 
manufacturing led to a slowdown in 
purchases of other technologies and 
slowed down construction of new 
manufacturing facilities based on 
foreign technologies. The plans of C-
DoT were, however, affected by the 
election of the new minority 
government in 1989, which 
immediately ordered a review of 
C-DoT’s technology and operations. 
 
There was a broad agreement in the 
government that given the country’s 
perilous balance of payments 
position, it was better to try and 
develop indigenous technology than 
buy it from foreign firms. Thus, the 
government panel gave a favorable 
review of C-DoT. 
 
 
 
Outcome Public Accounts 
Committee of the 
Lok Sabha (Lower 
House of the 
Parliament) 
recommended a 
complete overhaul 
of 
telecommunication
s, “which was 
working in a most 
? Ibid, p. 140 
 
This result: No 
private carriers 
and all investment 
in the sector 
came from the 
national 
government's 
budget. 
 By the late 1980’s, the government 
was attaching greater importance to 
the goal of expanding 
telecommunication services than it 
did in the first part of the decade. 
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India 
Attribute 
Aspect References Aspect References  
China 
unsatisfactory 
manner in 1985.” 
2. Development  of 
the New Economy 
 
Late 1980’s  
? A multitude of 
factors were 
impacting the way 
telecom policy was 
being formed: 
 
1. Greater 
importance to 
the goal of 
expanding 
telecoms 
services 
compared to 
the first part 
of the 
decade; 
2. Reliance on 
organic 
growth: India 
decided to 
design and 
build an 
indigenous 
telecommunic
ations switch 
to suite the 
unique Indian 
environmenta
l conditions – 
one that 
could work 
thru extreme 
variations of 
temperature, 
humidity, and 
dust, and 
whose 
manufacture 
would be 
licensed to 
private firms. 
1990s 
? The interests 
of the state took 
precedence over 
those of other 
interests groups 
like users, 
manufacturers and 
   Bottom-up Approach 
India managed to spawn a number 
of companies that soon began to 
compete internationally with the best 
that Europe and the United States 
have to offer. 
India is making fuller use of its 
resources and has chosen a path 
that may well deliver more 
sustainable progress than China’s 
FDI-driven approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Telecoms Policy announcement 
delayed until the end of 1991. 
-- Strong opposition of the 
Department of Telecommunications 
(DoT) bureaucrats and labor unions, 
who threatened by job loss, united to 
oppose any changes in the state 
monopoly.   
Top-down Approach
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Attribute 
Aspect References Aspect References  
China 
international 
telecom firms. 
New Economic and 
Industrial Policy - 
1991  
Broad guidelines 
for foreign equity 
investment and 
foreign venture laid 
out in Prime 
Minister’s New 
Economic Policy in 
June 1991. 
 
Outcome Process of 
accommodation 
and negotiation 
with local and 
foreign forces gave 
national economic 
policy a distinctive 
pace, sequence 
and form. 
 
   India is not outperforming China 
overall, but it is doing better in 
certain key areas. That success may 
enable it to catch up with and 
perhaps even overtake China.   
DoT compromised with state-tied 
interests and announced: 
“all services other than basic 
telephony, termed value-added, 
would be provided by private sector 
companies only and DoT would 
concentrate on telephony and their 
extension to rural areas.*4
 
3. Tentative First 
Steps: 
Constrained 
Competition 
The National 
Telecom Policy of 
1994 announced a 
series of specific 
targets to be 
achieved by 1997. 
It recognized that 
government 
financial resources 
would be 
inadequate to 
achieve these 
targets and 
concluded that 
private investment 
was required to 
bridge the resource 
gap. 
1 Professor 
Sidharth Sinha, 
Indian Institute of 
Management, 
Ahmedabad, 
India 
 
 
 
In anticipation of 
liberalization 
commitments of 
its accession to 
the WTO, China 
took tentative first 
steps by 
beginning to 
introduce 
competition in 
1994 and more 
major reforms 
were undertaken 
beginning in 
1998. 
 Government invited private sector 
participation in a phased manner. 
 
 
In 1994, China United 
Telecommunications Corporation 
(Unicom) was created to improve service 
quality by introducing managed 
competition. Pricing policies, such as 
service fee remained under MPT, and 
individual operators were not able to 
compete through price mechanism. 
4. Gradualism 
 
In 1997, an 
independent 
regulator, the 
Telecom 
Regulatory 
Authority of India 
(TRAI), was finally 
constituted, but has 
Crishna, 
Vickram. 1999. 
Telecommunicati
ons in India. 
India Telecom 
Country Paper, 
Workshop on 
Internet : South 
  Constraints in terms of artificial 
differentiation between local and 
long-distance (even international) 
connectivity were removed so that 
the power of the Internet paradigm 
could be realized for grassroots 
development. 
The government worked on system 
reforms for the MII and introduced the 
necessary legislation to be in compliance 
with their WTO commitments, notably the 
Basic 
Agreement on Telecommunications 
(BAT). Work on a telecommunications 
law has been ongoing since 1986 and 
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China 
been embroiled in 
controversy ever 
since, as the 
government has 
been unable to 
reconcile itself to 
losing control. 
Initially, TRAI is 
empowered to set 
telephony rates but 
not the terms and 
conditions for 
setting up 
telecommunication 
services. Rates for 
telephony and 
rentals have been 
revised to reduce 
cross-subsidies 
between long-
distance (national) 
and local 
telephony.  
Asian Realities 
and 
Opportunities 
Dhaka, April 5-8, 
1999, Session I. 
Telecom 
Policies, 
Regulations and 
Infrastructure 
Monday, 5 April, 
99, 13:45-15:30 
 
begun by the former MPT. Meanwhile, 
bureaucratic reforms that have gone on 
in tandem with industry reforms, which 
increased the number of new players, 
and rapid changes in technology, have 
forced revisions of the drafts before they 
were even issued. As a result the 
telecom industry has been to date 
governed by an ad hoc set of regulations. 
While the law appears to be still several 
more years in the making, a long-awaited 
provisional Telecommunication 
Regulation was issued in September of 
2001 in line with its World Trade 
Organization (WTO) commitments in the 
Telecoms sector.  
Outcome The new telecom 
policy had 
strengthened TRAI 
by awarding it the 
power of arbitration 
between 
government and 
private service 
providers. It also 
laid down a 
framework for 
permitting 
interconnection 
between any 
networks, at costs 
that each would 
set. The purpose 
was to allow 
services to define 
their business 
models 
pragmatically in 
terms of retail or 
institutional 
markets. 
   Private sector entry was slower than 
what was envisaged in NTP 1994.* 
 
These regulations and some follow up 
regulations are a very important first step 
towards developing a comprehensive 
and pro competitive regulatory 
framework, but there remain many issues 
of interpretation, clarity and 
implementation, and some areas which 
have not been adequately addressed. 
Moreover, as they are only regulations, 
they do not have the full effectiveness 
that a true Telecommunications Law 
would have. 
5. Toward Two 
Economies: 
Macro-economic 
 New 
Telecommunication
s Policy 1999 
 1949 – 1977: 
Telecommunicati
ons’ role in the 
1. L. Jintong, L. 
Xiongjian, and W. 
Yan, 
NTP-1999’s  stated objectives were 
to "Transform in a time bound 
manner, the telecommunications 
These policies ended the long period of 
slow development of 
telecommunications. But there was 
                                                          
34 Ministry of Information Industry 
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China 
Reforms without 
Redistributive 
Change 
 
(NTP-1999) national economy 
was not 
recognized 
correctly. 
Since 1978, 
Chinese 
telecommunicatio
ns has been 
developed 
gradually in four 
stages:  
1. 1978-1984 
To meet the 
needs of 
economic 
development, the 
State Council 
offered special 
telecoms policies, 
such as low 
taxes.  
▼ 
2. 1984–1989 
Chinese economy 
grew rapidly and 
the demands for 
telecommunicatio
ns increased 
speedily. 
▼ 
3. 1989-1997 
Foundation of 
China Unicom in 
1993 
▼ 
4. 1998-
Present 
Foundation of 
MII34 in 1998, and 
the reconstruction 
of China Telecom 
in 1999-2001. 
After the 
reorganization in 
May 2002, the 
new “5-1” 
structure was 
introduced, 
thereby 
establishing 
China Telecom, 
Telecommunicati
ons in China: 
Development and 
Prospects. Nova 
Science, 2001 
2. Y. Hui, 
“Regulation 
System of China’s 
Government,” in 
China Posts and 
Telecommunicati
ons 2002 Annual 
Report, Beijing, 
MPT, 2003, pp. 
93-103, 1998. 
3. L. Xiongjian, 
and Zhang Jing, 
“Development 
and Regulatory 
System Reform of 
the 
Telecommunicati
ons Industry in 
China,” Global 
Communications 
Newsletter, 
November 2003. 
sector to a greater competitive 
environment in both urban and rural 
areas providing equal opportunities 
and level playing field for all 
players".** 
Government has generally followed 
an approach of free and unlimited 
entry. *** 
capacity shortage in big cities. So, then, 
the MPT35 began to actively introduce 
foreign funding, modern technologies, 
and management methods. 
▼ 
Telecommunications were recognized as 
a strategic pivot for the national economy 
and developed preferentially under 
favorable policies approved by the State 
Council. In addition, local governments 
also supported telecoms development 
These forces accelerated the 
development of telecoms and signaled 
the beginning of high-speed takeoff of 
telecoms in China. 
▼ 
Telecoms network of China became the 
second largest in the world. With network 
development, its management stepped 
into a new period. 
▼ 
China’s telecoms industry needs further 
development. The general goal for 2005 
is to satisfy the needs of economic and 
societal development. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
35 Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications 
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China 
China CNC, 
China Mobile,  
China Unicom, 
China CRC, and 
China Satellite as 
the six main 
operators. 
Outcome The TRAI 
completed a review 
of cellular tariffs 
and provided its 
assessment of the 
current and 
expected levels of 
competition in 
these sectors: 
"A stage has been 
reached, when 
market forces can 
effectively regulate 
cellular tariff and 
the Regulator has 
to step aside 
except for a broad 
supervision in the 
interest of the 
consumer.”  
 
 
 
 
   Two important characteristics of the 
growth of cellular market – 
1. Relatively higher growth of pre-
paid subscribers in comparison 
to post-paid Subscribers 
2. Considerable increase in the 
level of competition in a 
number of service areas. 
This trend has become more 
pronounced in all service areas after 
the entry of the incumbent as the 
third operator and a private operator 
as the fourth. 
There is also competition from the 
Wireless in Local Loop with Limited 
Mobility.  
In light of this development, TRAI 
has decided to 'forbear' from 
regulating tariffs in the cellular sector 
and has left the tariffs to be 
determined by market forces. 
Despite opening up the telecoms 
industry to foreign investment, 
China’s telecoms sector today 
remains the most restricted and 
regulated of all the major developing-
country countries in the region. The 
obstacles faced by foreign players 
include lack of clear and concise 
legislation governing the sector, 
regulatory implementation and 
enforcement, true competition, and 
regulatory independence.  Thus far, 
government has only allowed limited 
competition through the creation of a 
number of operators, mostly 
diversified components of its 
operational arm, China Telecom 
(CT), and all still state owned.  While 
the regulatory environment governing 
the sector has been restructured to 
separate the regulatory and 
operational entities, the impartiality of 
the regulatory environment has been 
questioned. 
6. Retreat from 
Social Goals of 
Planning: 
Domestic 
Constraints and 
Foreign Pressures 
According to 
government replies 
in Parliament in 
1999-2000, 
“An important 
bottleneck to 
foreign direct 
investment in the 
telecoms sector is 
the 49 per cent cap 
on foreign 
holdings.” 36
The government 
reconsidered its 
policy of limiting 
foreign investment 
at 49 per cent. A 
high powered 
 1998 
The Ministry of 
Information 
Industry, a 
relatively 
independent 
regulator, 
replaced the 
Ministry of Posts 
and 
Telecommunicati
on (MPT) to 
monitor and 
regulate China’s 
information 
technology, 
telecommunicatio
ns, and software 
 Vexed by the ownership cap, several 
telecom companies including US 
West, Nynex, Swiss Telecom, Bell 
Canada, Bezeq of Israel, Telecom 
Italia, Shinawatra of Thailand, 
Philippine Telecom and Australia’s 
Telstra Corporation wound up their 
investments in India. 
The government decided to allow 
restructuring of equity of the licensee 
company. 
The existing Indian partner was 
allowed to acquire the foreign 
partner's shareholding.  
Merger of Indian companies was 
also permitted as long as 
competition was not compromised. 
Industry experts argue that more efforts 
are needed to establish a truly 
competitive environment in China, 
including the introduction of mechanism 
of competition by Chinese enterprises 
with foreign counterparts in China. 
                                                          
36 Declining FDI flow in telecom sector; The Hindu; August 9, 2000; http://www.indiaserver.com/thehindu/2000/08/09/stories/06090006.htm  
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Directions/Trends/Descriptions India China 
India 
Attribute 
Aspect References Aspect References  
China 
committee under 
the chairmanship of 
the finance minister 
looked into the 
scope for lifting the 
49 per cent 
investment cap. 
The move followed 
requests by leading 
domestic telecom 
companies, who 
seemed unable to 
raise the capital 
necessary for 
expanding 
services.37
 
industries. Thus 
begun the reform 
of telecoms 
industry.  
Outcome Spate of mergers 
and acquisitions in 
the Indian cellular 
industry. 
 The monopoly in 
telecoms services 
was broken and 
competition into 
the market 
introduced. 
 The move to open up international 
long distance sector well ahead of 
the WTO commitment of year 2004 
was also viewed as a sop for 
international firms investing in Indian 
telecom. 
Privatization is still lacking. So is a legal 
system. 
Whether the market structure would bring 
fair and just competition remains to be 
seen.  
In the absence of a telecommunications 
law, the regulatory organizations cannot 
regulate operators in a competitive 
environment.  
Foreign telecommunications operators 
entering the Chinese market remain 
skeptical about the regulatory system in 
China.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
37 Panel set up to mull Lifting 49% FDI cap on telecom; Business Standard; November 10,2000 
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Appendix B. Variables: Their Working Definitions and Literature References 
 
Variables Working Definitions Literature Reference 
Telecoms reform variables (Rit) 
 
1. Full_priv 
 
 
 
 
2. Partial_priv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Priv 
 
 
 
 
4. Competition 
Vector of telecoms reforms 
 
1. Full (or control) privatization 
for a nation in a year in 
which the majority owners 
are non-state 
 
2. Partial (or revenue) 
privatization is for a nation 
in a year when there is 
positive private ownership 
but state ownership still 
dominates 
 
3. Privatization represents a 
variable for a nation in a 
year when there is either full 
or partial privatization 
 
4. An index measuring the 
degree of competition in the 
telecoms sector  
Bortolott et al. 2004. 
 
Carsten et al. 2002. 
 
Kilkeri, Sunita; Nellis, John; and 
Shirley, Mary. Privatization: The 
Lessons of Experience. Washington, 
D.C. World Bank, 1992.  
   
Country economic indicators 
[Control Variables (Xit)]: 
 
 
1. Population 
 
 
2. UrbanPop 
 
 
3. GDP-PC 
 
 
 
Control variables defined as: 
 
 
 
1. The population of a nation, 
in millions 
 
2. The share of urban 
population of a nation 
 
3. GDP per capita of a nation, 
in 1995 U.S. $ 
 
 
Literature cites these macroeconomic 
indicators to come up with a summary 
description of economic environment 
in a sample country.  
 
Li, Wei and Xu, Lixin Colin. 2004. 
The Impact of Privatization and 
Competition in the 
Telecommunications Sector Around 
The World. Journal of Law and 
Economics, Vol. XLVII. 
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Variables Working Definitions Literature Reference 
4. log(CPI) 4. Logarithm of Consumer 
Price index (CPI = 1 in 
1990) 
Country Specific Effects (φ) 
 
This represents country-specific 
heterogeneity (e.g., interest group 
pressures), which might influence 
both policy changes and industry 
performance. 
 
Time Trend (t) 
 
 
This will capture the effects of 
technological changes.  
 
 
Telecom performance variables 
[Outcome Measures (yit)]  
 
1. Inv_PC 
 
2. PLocal 
 
3. Qindex 
 
4. LPindex 
 
5. Lindex 
 
6. Mobile_Density 
 
 
 
1.Telecoms investment per capita 
 
2. The local price index 
 
3.The output index 
 
4.The index of labor productivity 
 
5.The labor index. 
 
6.Mobile telephone density 
Roller, Lars-Hendrick, and 
Waverman, Leonard. 
“Telecommunications 
Infrastructure and Economic 
Development: A Simultaneous 
Approach. The American Economic 
Review 91 (2001): 909-23.  
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Appendix C. The Elements of Grounded Theory 
 
Grounded theory has three basic elements: concepts, categories and propositions. The 
basic units of analysis are concepts, for it is through conceptualization of data, not the actual data 
per se, that theory will emerge. According to Corbin and Strauss (1990, p. 7). 
“Theories can't be built with actual incidents or activities as observed or reported; that is, 
from "raw data." The incidents, events, happenings are taken as, or analyzed as, potential 
indicators of phenomena, which are thereby given conceptual labels. … Only by comparing 
incidents and naming like phenomena with the same term can the theorist accumulate the basic 
units for theory.” 
Corbin and Strauss (1990, p. 7) defines categories, the second element of grounded 
theory, in the following way: 
“Categories are higher in level and more abstract than the concepts they represent. They 
are generated through the same analytic process of making comparisons to highlight similarities 
and differences that is used to produce lower level concepts. Categories are the "cornerstones" of 
developing theory. They provide the means by which the theory can be integrated.” 
The third element of grounded theory, propositions, indicates generalized relationships 
between a category and its concepts and between discrete categories. Glaser and Strauss (1967) 
originally termed this 'hypotheses'. However, Whetten (1989, p. 492) points out that propositions 
involve conceptual relationships whereas hypotheses require measured relationships. The 
grounded approach produces conceptual and not measured relationships, thus the former term is 
more accepted. 
It is through an iterative process that the concepts, categories, and propositions are 
generated and developed. Grounded theory is not generated a priori, rather, it is, 
 
... inductively derived from the study of the phenomenon it represents. That is, discovered, 
developed, and provisionally verified through systematic data collection and analysis of data 
pertaining to that phenomenon. Therefore, data collection, analysis, and theory should stand in 
reciprocal relationship with each other. One does not begin with a theory, then prove it. Rather, 
one begins with an area of study and what is relevant to that area is allowed to emerge. (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1990, p. 23. Emphasis added.) 
 
The Process of Generating Grounded Theory 
Bearing in mind that a fine balance between prescription and generality is required, based 
on Glaser & Strauss’ lean structure, Table C-1 provides a summary interpretation of the phases, 
procedures or steps, and research quality criteria to the generation of grounded theory38. This 
summary forms the template for subsequent description of how these prescriptions are applied in 
this dissertation research paper.  
 
 
                                                          
38 The original derivation of grounded theory (Glaser, & Strauss, 1967). focused critically on the generation of theory 
from data without reference to the researcher’s prior knowledge of the phenomena under investigation. This derivation 
was not clear and precise enough to define the methodological procedures or steps required of the researcher in 
correctly undertaking the process (Schatzman, 1991, p 303-314) The procedural stages Glaser & Strauss (1967) 
outlined were reflective of a rather "parsimonious structure" (Miller & Fredericks 1999, p.538). However, recent 
attempts to overcome this lack of procedural clarity (e.g. Strauss & Corbin, 1990) have received criticism because the 
operational procedures prescribed by the authors implicitly require application of the researcher’s prior knowledge 
(Robrecht, 1995) and that is a violation of the underlying premise of the methodology.  
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PHASE ACTIVITY RATIONALE 
RESEARCH DESIGN PHASE 
Step 1 Review of technical 
literature 
Definition of research 
question  
Definition of a priori 
constructs  
Focuses 
efforts  
Constrains irrelevant variation and sharpens external 
validity  
Step 2 Selecting cases Theoretical, not 
random, sampling  
Focuses efforts on theoretically useful cases (e.g., those that test 
and/or extend theory) 
DATA COLLECTION PHASE 
Step 3 Develop rigorous data 
collection protocol 
Create case study 
database  
Employ multiple 
data collection 
methods  
Qualitative and 
quantitative data  
Increases reliability Increases construct validity  
Strengthens grounding of theory by triangulation of 
evidence. Enhances internal validity  
Synergistic view of evidence  
Step 4 Entering the field Overlap data 
collection 
and analysis  
Flexible and 
opportunistic data 
collection methods  
Speeds analysis and reveals 
helpful adjustments to data collection  
Allows investigators to take advantage of emergent 
themes and unique case features  
DATA ORDERING PHASE 
Step 5 Data ordering Arraying events 
chronologically  
Facilitates easier data analysis. Allows examination of 
processes  
DATA ANALYSIS PHASE 
Step 6 Analyzing 
data relating to 
the first case 
Use open 
coding  
Use axial 
coding  
Use selective 
coding  
Develop concepts, categories and properties  
Develop connections between a category and its sub-
categories  
Integrate categories to build theoretical framework  
All forms of coding enhance internal validity  
Step 7 Theoretical sampling Literal and theoretical 
replication across cases 
(go to step 2 until 
theoretical saturation) 
Confirms, extends, and sharpens theoretical framework  
Step 8 Reaching closure Theoretical saturation 
when possible  
Ends process when marginal improvement becomes small  
LITERATURE COMPARISON PHASE 
Step 9 Compare emergent 
theory with extant 
literature 
Comparisons with 
conflicting frameworks  
Comparisons with 
similar frameworks  
Improves construct definitions, and therefore internal 
validity  
Also improves external validity by establishing the 
domain to which the study's findings can be generalised   
Source: This table represents author’s modifications to one referenced in Pandit, N. R. (1996).  
 
Table C-1: The process of building grounded theory 
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Research Design Phase.  Easterby-Smith et al. (1990, p. 21) defines research design in 
terms of: 
... what kind of evidence is gathered from where, and how such evidence is interpreted in 
order to provide good answers to the basic research question[s]. 
 
The first step is to define the basic research questions narrowly so that the research is 
focused, yet broad enough to allow for flexibility and serendipity. 
'Technical literature' (i.e., reports of research studies and theoretical and philosophical 
papers characteristic of professional and disciplinary writing) on the general problem area is a 
good source of research questions in grounded theory studies (Strass and Corbin 1990, p. 52). 
Once basic research questions are generated and the research is focused, the next aspect 
of research design and the second step is to select the first case.  The principle of theoretical 
sampling refers to the case selection as the process of data collection for generating theory 
whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyzes his data and decides what data to collect 
next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges (Glaser and Strauss 
1967, p. 45).  
During initial data collection, a full 'deep' coverage of the data is necessary because the 
main categories are emerging. Subsequently, the focus changes to the development of properties 
and propositions and at that stage, theoretical sampling deals only with collecting data on 
categories. The category's 'theoretical saturation' determines the stopping point where the 
theoretical sampling should stop. Glaser and Strauss (1967) describe the theoretical saturation as 
when: 
 
... no additional data are being found whereby the (researcher) can develop properties of the 
category. As he sees similar instances over and over again, the researcher becomes empirically 
confident that a category is saturated ... when one category is saturated, nothing remains but to go 
on to new groups for data on other categories, and attempt to saturate these categories also 
(p.65).39
 
In practical terms, theoretical sampling has two stages: an initial case is selected; the data 
analysis pertaining to this case should point to an emerging theory, and based on that, additional 
cases are chosen. 
 The initial case (unit of data) in this study is the literature on the subject of telecoms 
restructuring. According to Strauss and Corbin (1990), 
 
The literature can be used as secondary sources of data. Research publications often include 
quoted materials from interviews and field notes and these quotations can be used as secondary 
sources of data for your own purposes. The publications may also include descriptive materials 
concerning events, actions, settings, and actors' perspectives, that can be used as data using the 
methods described (p. 52). 
  
The grounded analysis of the first 'literature' case from India led to the generation of the 
initial theoretical framework of complexity analysis. Additional 'empirical' cases from China, 
                                                          
39 Not all categories are equally relevant, and so the depth of enquiry into each one should not be the same. When the 
core categories, i.e., those with the greatest explanatory power, become stable in the face of new data and rich in detail, 
they are considered saturated. 
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Russia, Viet Nam, Cots Rica, Uzbekistan, one at a time, have been used to test and extend this 
framework.40
After the analysis of the six cases, there was hardly any improvement needed to the 
theoretical framework and the decision to conclude the research was taken. This experience is 
line with Martin and Turner (1986) who affirm: 
 
By the time three or four sets of data have been analyzed, the majority of useful concepts will have 
been discovered (p.149). 
 
Data Collection Phase.  About the data collection phase, the grounded approach 
advocates the use of multiple data sources converging on the same phenomenon and terms these 
'slices of data.' Glaser and Strauss (1967) remind the reader, 
 
In theoretical sampling, no one kind of data on a category nor technique for data collection is 
necessarily appropriate. Different kinds of data give the analyst different views or vantage points 
from which to understand a category and to develop its properties; these different views we have 
called slices of data. While the [researcher] may use one technique of data collection primarily, 
theoretical sampling for saturation of a category allows a multifaceted investigation, in which 
there are no limits to the techniques of data collection, the way they are used, or the types of data 
acquired. (p.65, Emphasis in original.) 
 
In the same vein, other authors advocate a synergistic approach: 
 
... case study research can involve qualitative data only, quantitative only, or both... Moreover, the 
combination of data types can be highly synergistic (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.538). 
 
According to the synergistic approach (or 'data triangulation'), qualitative data can 
indicate directly observable relationships and corroborate the findings from quantitative data. 
Qualitative data can help understand the rationale of the theory and underlying relationships. 
The purpose of using multiple data sources is to enhance construct validity and reliability. To 
further enhance reliability, there is a need for a case study database which is a formal assembly 
of evidence distinct from the case study report. As Yin (1989) states: 
 
Every case study project should strive to develop a formal, retrievable database, so that in 
principle, other investigators can review the evidence directly and not be limited to the written 
reports. In this manner, the database will increase markedly the reliability of an entire case study. 
(p.98-99, Emphasis added.) 
 
                                                          
40 The principle of theoretical sampling points out that each additional case serves specific purposes within the overall 
scope of enquiry. Yin identified three options (1989, p. 53-54): 
(a) Choose a case to fill theoretical categories, to extend the emerging theory; and/or,  
(b) Choose a case to replicate previous case(s) to test the emerging theory; or,  
(c) Choose a case that is a polar opposite to extend the emerging theory.  
Each additional case must, therefore, be carefully selected to produce similar results (a literal replication - options (a) 
and (b) above); or, contrary results but for predictable reasons (a theoretical replication - option (c) above). 
The second case or unit of data, China which experienced a telecoms restructuring during the period 1990-99, was 
selected for the purpose of literal replication, that is, to fill theoretical categories and to test the emerging theory. The 
third case, Russia which experienced contrary results during the period 1975-89 was again chosen for the purposes of 
theoretical replication. 
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The third step, therefore, involves the development of a rigorous data collection protocol by:  
 
a. Using multiple data collection methods that account for both qualitative and 
quantitative data and systematically  
b. Establishing a case study database. 
 
The principal data source in this study for the six 'empirical' cases (i.e., India, China, 
Russia, Viet Nam, Costa Rica, and Uzbekistan) was reports in newspapers, trade journals, 
business journals, government publications, annual company documents and commercial 
diplomacy press releases. The World Bank Institute and the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU) websites are the largest on-line sources of telecoms business information of its 
kind. The International Trade and Commercial Diplomacy family of complimentary databases 
contains more than 100 article abstracts, forecasts, statistical series and full text records on a 
broad range of business and industry restructuring issues.  While reading an article published in 
the Commercial Diplomacy website, the author thought of developing grounded theory based on 
this type of data.  
In this dissertation research project, Commercial Diplomacy documentary sources have 
been treated like sets of field notes. Analysis and category generation was commenced at the first 
paragraph of each report obtained from the Commercial Diplomacy Institute41, and a theoretical 
framework generated which would handle the aspects perceived to be of interest to each 
paragraph.  
The preceding step ensures that the fourth step involving data collection and analyses is 
done simultaneously, while maintaining flexibility. Often adjustments are made to the data 
collection process in light of the emerging findings. This flexibility is in line with what 
Eisenhardt described as 'controlled opportunism (1989, p.12). 
                                                          
41 A former U.S. Trade Representative, Geza Fukutituke, whom the author interviewed during the course of the 
qualitative research phase, permitted a full access to several documents and research reports prepared under his 
guidance at the Monterey Institute of International Trade and Commercial Diplomacy.  
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The dissertation approach as a whole must consider data collection, data ordering, and 
data analysis as interrelated steps depicted in figure C-1 in which the attached numbers indicate 
the activity's analytic sequence identified earlier in Table C-1. 
 
 1.1.1.1.1 Data Analysis (4)   
 
 
  1.1.1.1.2 Theory 
Development (5) 
 
1.1.1.1.3 Data Ordering 
(3) 
 
 
  
 
 1.1.1.1.4 Theory Saturation ?  1.1.1.1.5 Yes 
1.1.1.1.6 Data Collection 
(2) 
 
 
 
 
 
  1.1.1.1.7 No  
1.1.1.1.9 Theoretical 
Sampling (1)   
 
1.1.1.1.8 Reach 
Closure
(6) 
 
Figure C-1: The Interrelated Processes of Data Collection, Data Ordering, and Data Analysis to 
Build Grounded Theory 
 
 
The process of coding involves the use of this general framework to generate concepts by 
performing data analysis for each case. According to Strauss and Corbin (1990), coding42  
                                                          
42 Open coding, axial coding, and selective coding represent the three analytic types and the researcher must not 
necessarily move from open through axial to selective coding in a strict linear progression. 
Open coding deals with the labeling and categorizing of phenomena as indicated by the data. Labeling and categorizing 
produce concepts which constitute the basic building blocks in grounded theory construction. 
Open coding applies the concept of 'the comparative method', which amounts to asking questions and making 
comparisons. Initially, simple questions such as what, where, how, when, how much, etc. break down data. Then, we 
compare data and group together similar incidents and give the same conceptual label. Categorizing refers to the 
process of grouping concepts at a higher and more abstract level. 
While open coding divides and sub-divides data into concepts and categories, axial coding makes connections between 
a category and its sub-categories (i.e., not between discrete categories which is done in selective coding) and puts those 
data back together in new ways, thereby identifying and developing main categories and their sub-categories. 
Selective coding refers to the integration of the categories that have been developed to form the initial theoretical 
framework. 
First, there is a story which is simply a descriptive narrative about the central phenomenon of study and then there is 
the story line which refers to the conceptualization of this story (abstracting). Upon analysis, the story line is 
transformed into the core category. 
The core category (i.e., the central idea, event or happening) is the phenomenon. Other categories relate to this core 
category in accordance with the schema. Causal conditions refer to the events which lead to the development of the 
phenomenon. Context defines the particular set of conditions and intervening conditions, the broader set of conditions, 
in which the phenomenon is embedded. Action/interaction strategies imply the actions and responses that occur as the 
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... represents the operations by which data are broken down, conceptualized, and put back together 
in new ways. It is the central process by which theories are built from data (p. 57). 
 
The purpose of coding is to suggest relationships and let the data validate by moving between 
different planes (namely, asking questions, generating propositions and making comparisons) of 
a paradigm model depicted in figure C- 2 below. 
 
 Causal Conditions 
 
 
 Phenomenon 
 
 
 Context 
 
 
 Intervening Conditions 
 
 
 Action / Interaction Strategies
 
 
 Consequences 
 
Figure C-2: The Paradigm Model 
 
 
Corbin and Strauss (1990) stress that an important activity during coding is the writing of 
memos.43
 
Writing theoretical memos is an integral part of doing grounded theory. Since the analyst cannot 
readily keep track of all the categories, properties, hypotheses, and generative questions that 
evolve from the analytical process, there must be a system for doing so. The use of memos 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
result of the phenomenon, and the outcomes, both intended and unintended, of these actions and responses render 
explicit the consequences. 
Strauss and Corbin summarize it best: “The core category must be the sun, standing in orderly systematic relationships 
to its planets (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p. 124). 
The underlying purpose of the paradigm model is to allow the researcher to relate data in complex ways while thinking 
about them systematically. According to this model, subsidiary categories are related to the core category. 
43 Memos may be distinguished by their types and usages: code memos, theoretical memos and operational memos. 
Code memos refer to open coding and focus on conceptual labeling. Theoretical memos are about axial and selective 
coding and thus point to paradigm features and indications of process. Operational memos contain directions 
concerning the evolving research design. 
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constitutes such a system. Memos are not simply "ideas." They are involved in the formulation 
and revision of theory during the research process (p.10). 
 
In this phase of the dissertation research, data were analyzed using the author’s own 
intuition, judgment, conceptual decision, and interpretations. The use of computer programs to 
aid the analysis of qualitative data is a recent innovation. However, no qualitative data analysis 
software package has been used in this research effort to facilitate the construction of case study 
databases. 
The seventh step in theory building case research entails testing and developing the 
framework with additional cases, invoking the principle of theoretical sampling. The purpose, as 
referenced earlier, is to extend and/or sharpen the emerging theory by filling in categories, which 
warrant further refinement and/or development. Reaching closure, the eighth step, is also taken 
according to the principle of theoretical saturation, that is, when the marginal value of the new 
data becomes rather insignificant. 
 
Literature Comparison Phase.  About the ninth and final step, Eisenhardt(1989) 
reminds the reader: 
 
… tying the emergent theory to existing literature enhances the internal validity, … and theoretical 
level of the theory building from case study research ... because the findings often rest on a very 
limited number of cases (p. 545). 
 
The emergent theory of telecoms restructuring has been compared with the extant 
theories in the broader field of crisis hypothesis, special interest groups, learning, foreign aid, 
and political institutions. This revealed the discovered theory to resemble in many ways Qiang’s  
and Xu’s  (2004)"constituents demand hypothesis, private-interest hypothesis, the ideology 
hypothesis, and some hypothesis emerging from the new institutional economics."  
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Appendix D. Glossary 
 
Access Deficit Charge (ADC) 
Access Deficit Charge (ADC), is the amount payable by the service provider at the 
caller's end to the service provider at the receiving end for accessing services rendered by 
the latter in domestic long distance telephony. 
 
Calling Party Pays 
Calling Party Pays (CPP) refers to one of the methods of billing calls whereby the called 
mobile party pays for the airtime. This asymmetry exists only in some countries but not 
in others.  
 
Competition 
Experts argue that competition, when applied to telecommunications, leads to more and 
better services at more affordable rates, and that experience supports this view. 
 
Interconnect Usage Charge (IUC) 
Interconnection Usage Charge covers charges payable by one operator to another for 
origination, transit, and termination of calls in a multi-operator environment. 
 
Liberalization 
Liberalization refers to a process of changing state, social, and economic institutions to 
allow and promote increased use of market mechanisms to guide social, economic, and 
political life.  
 
Privatization 
A very broad term--but most simply, privatization is the transfer of assets or service 
delivery from the government to the private sector. Privatization runs a very broad range, 
sometimes leaving very little government involvement, and other times creating 
partnerships between government and private service providers where government is still 
the dominant player.  
 
Purchasing Power Parity 
Purchasing power parity (PPP) is a theory of exchange rate determination and a way to 
compare the average costs of goods and services between countries. The theory is based 
on an extension and variation of the "law of one price" as applied to the aggregate 
economy. 
 
Teledensity 
Teledensity refers to the number of telephones per 100 people in a region. 
 
 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) 
The TRA promotes and balances the interests of subscribers and other users, and 
promotes effective and fair competition among new and existing licensed operators. The 
TRA is required to carry out its duties and exercise its powers in a non-discriminatory 
and transparent manner.  
 
© 2006 Sprouts 6(4), pp 166-220, http://sprouts.case.edu/2006/060406.pdf                                        219
                             Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/6-7
MAITRA/ASIAN MOBILE SERVICES 
Unified Licensing Regime 
In view of recent technological developments in the telecom sector, extended scope of 
service provided by new technologies, falling cost of wireless services, blurring of 
differences between wireline and wireless, increasing competition among the services, 
the converging tariffs for wire and wireless services and the international trend for non-
service specific licenses through a process of Authorization/Converged licenses, today 
there is no justification in continuing a service-wise licensing regime. Instead, the most 
favored choice is for a unified licensing regime whereby service providers are given the 
opportunity to offer any or all telecom services using technology of their choice. This 
regime promises economies of scope/scale and flexibility in regime will result in 
new/existing services being offered to consumers at affordable prices.  
 
Unified Access Service 
The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) gave its recommendations to the 
Government of India in October 2003 to move toward a unified licensing regime, starting 
with a unified access-licensing regime for basic and cellular services in the first phase, 
thereby ensuring technology neutrality for service providers. Unified access relates to all: 
wired or wireless, fixed or mobile. 
 
USO Fund 
The Universal Service Obligation Fund (USO), set up by the Government of India, 
supports the spread of mobile Internet to the interior of India. A separate administrative 
organization attached to the Department of Telecom administers the fund whose 
disbursement is accomplished through a multi-layered bidding process. 
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